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During its 200 year history the Uni ted States has 
developed from a simple agrarian economy i nto the most 
highly industrialized nati on in the world. Much of the 
early growth of American history was facilitated by the 
abundance of low cost mineral raw materials. This gen-
eral abundance of raw materials continued into the 
twentieth century, but during the past few decades the 
low cost domestic reserves of many raw materials have 
become seriously depleted. In addition, advances in 
technology and industrialization have generated require-
ments for other mineral resources which the United States 
either does not possess or which are not economically 
available from domestic sources. Thus, the United States 
is no longer self-suffici ent i n mineral resources, and 
is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign sources of 
mineral raw materials. 
This reliance on raw mat erial imports has a direct 
effect on the ability of the United St ates• industrial 
base to support the needs of both the civilian and 
military sectors of the economy. In times of military 
1 
or political emergency, sources of many critically needed 
minerals could be closed as in the recent oil embargo by 
the oil producing nations. Sheet mica, vital in the 
electrical and electronics industry, is imported from 
primarily three foreign sources with 89% of the United 
States' demand being supplied by India. 1 Likewise, the 
platinum group of minerals, important in many industries 
including the electronics and chemical, are primarily 
available only from foreign sources. About 52% of the 
1972 United States' demand for platinum group elements 
was supplied by· the Union of Soviet Socialist Replublics 
(USSR) 2 , Other minerals for which the United States is 
highly dependent on foreign sources are manganese, alu~ 
minum 1 chromium, cobalt and nickel to cite a few. 
Both the economic and military strength of the United 
States are highly dependent on the maintenance of a 
strong industrial capacity and as such they are in turn 
becoming. more reliant on raw material imports. If this 
flow of raw materials were to be interrupted for an ex-
tended period of time, the industrial base, the economic 
strength, the military capacity and indeed the national 
security of the United States would be severely 
jeopardized, 
In his book, Strategy and Economics, Major General 
A. N. Lagovskiy, a Soviet military economist, indicates 
2 
that there are no sharp boundar ies between modern eco-
nomic and military problems, and that an understanding of 
the economic factors of war is essential to the compre-
hension of the actual motive forces of war. 3 In assessing 
the military capability of the United States, General 
Lagovskiy concludes, 
Consequently the weakness of t he economy of 
the USA, with all its strengths as a whole, lies 
in the fact that it either has no reserves of 
many materials that are important for war pro-
duction inside the country, or has them only in 
small quantities. From this arises the unavoid-
able import
4
of the raw material in quite large 
quantities. 
This report will review in detail General Lagovskiy•s 
"weak link 11 as it pertains to selected mineral resources 
and will indicate some of the means available to assure 
the adequate and uninterrupted supply of these minerals 
necessary to meet t~e industrial and military requirements 
of the United S.tates for the 1980 • s. 
To understand the problem as it pertains to a par-
ticular resource, it is necessary to study the supply 
and demand constraints on that resource together with 
the geographic and foreign policy implications that might 
affect its continuous availability. This study will re- . 
view the current situation as pertains to specific 
mineral resources, namely chromium, cobalt and the 
platinum group metals. Each of these minerals is vital 
3 
'. 
to the needs of the civilian and military sectors of the· 
economy and little, if any, of the demand is satis.fied by 
domestic product.ton. : 
.It will° be necessary throughout the study to 1,1se past 
,d~ta and projectiC>ns on the supply and .demand situations 
of various minerals .• The elements of .data used in this· 
,' 
study have t,'een- obtained from. United States Bureau of · .. : . . 
Mine~' publications~ government studies and other sourc:es 
fel1: to be reliable, The authors will not ·review in. 
_detail the. tech~ique~ and bases for the individual pro.; 
. jections or estimates,: rbut they will be1 assumed to be . . . . 
accl.lrate and r~alistic prod~cts of· reliable research, 
In examining the problem,,. this · study _wiil. first re.,; 
view·the background of the problem by briefly·considering 
' ' 
the history of the overall supply and demand for -resources·· 
. . . ' . . 
.riot only within the. Uni tad States but worldwide, . The .. 
re\'i:eY{ _wj,11 hiih{i~ht :a few; ~i the no~able probl!!nis :en- , . 
. ·, . . .,, 
. · countered in th.e recent· past .• 
••, •· ' •• ,/ • ,. : • ' ' : a • • ' : '." • ' • • • • • ' .- • '•' • :• • • -~ t 
, . ,: Upon: ,conclusion of the brief historical account, the 
particul~ p~oblems associated wi1:h assuring· an .adequa~e · · 
and urilnt1;1rrupte~ s,upply . of chromium' cobalt and the . 
. . ' . - . . . .· 
platinum. gr(?UP il!etais will be addressed. •· After th.e de-,·. · .. 
tailec(description .of the problem, a review of actions ·. 
. : : . ', . - :. . ' ' ' ' "~ ·. ; .. _ - . . . -_ . . .. - '.. ~ ' . .. 
taken to. date and their success will be ·examined,· , These · . '• ·.·· ' . ., ·, . ' ' ( •· . . . ' . . , 
ihdividual detailed· studies will be conclude.d with 
4 
.• . 
• .'-' ',. ;· .-t 
comments concerning future policies and actions to 
alleviate potential shortages for each mineral resource. 
In the final portion of this study, the Authors will draw some 
general conclusions and recommendations based on the 
individual detailed studies. 
Before entering into the main portion of this study, 
the definition of three terms that will be used frequently 
must be clearly understood. These terms are: mineral 
reserves, mineral resources, and strategic minerals. 
Reserves are mineral deposits that have been 
reasonably well identified and that are sufficiently 
rich in grade to be worked profitably under ex-
isting economic conditions. Thus, reserves are a 
small portion of total resources and bear virtually 
no relationship to total mineral resources in the 
ground, or to amounts of min~ral resources that 
may ultimately be recovered. Because of .this 
relationship, reserve data is important only for 
the near future.5 
Resources include reserves, and also identified 
sub-economic resources, hypothetical resources, 
and speculative resources. Identified sub-
economic resources are those that are known, 
but are too low in grade to be economic now. 
However, improvements in mineral technology 
can move them into the reserve category. 
Hypothetical resources have not yet been 
discovered, but are geologically predictable 
in known mineral districts. Increased ex-
ploration activity and new earth science theory 
and methods can move these resources into 
identified categories_. Speculative resources 
are those thought to exist in other than known 
mineral districts. The possibility that 
speculative resources exist in a given region 
must be judged by broad geologic similarities or 
by statistical relationships with known mineral 
districts. Looking to the future, for the 
5 
middle and. long-term, resource data are vastly 
more significant than reserve data.6 
Strategic Minerls are those minerals essential 
to the natlona defense for the supply of. which 
in war q~pendence must be placed in whole, or 
in a large part, on sources outside the Continental 
Limits ' of the United States, and for which strict 
conservation and. control measures will be necessary. 7 
6 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
The large scale production and consumption of mineral 
resources is a relatively recent phenomenon. Worldwide 
production and distribution before the Industrial Revolu-
tion were inconsequential and did not expand rapidly 
until the latter half of the nineteen century. Since 
that time, worldwide mineral usage•'has risen at an ex-
ponential rate. For example, from 1900 to 1938, world 
mineral production and consumption exceeded that of all 
preceding his_tory, l· By 19 50, the United States alone 
consumed six times the total world consumption by 1900. By 
specific minerals, consumption of iron ore rose three and one 
half times, copper usage increased three times and zinc usage 
increased four times between 1900 and 1950. 2 If these 
trends continue, as is expected, by the year 2000 the 
world demand for minerals will be five times greater 
than in 1973. 3 
In addition to this rapid increase in the production 
and consumption of individual minerals, there has also 
been a significant increase in the aggregate number of 
minerals necessary to support a modern industrialized 
7 
economy. This demand originated as technological progress 
created new products and discovered useful applications 
for previously undesirable minerals. Titanium is an 
excellent example of this change. In 1948 total production 
of titanium was only three tons and the mineral was 
regarded as a contaminant in large bodies of iron ore. 
By 1971, production was in excess of 3.7 million metric 
tons and titanium was an essential component in the air-
craft and aerospace industries. Similar changes in demand for 
other minerals have increased the number of industrially 
essential minerals from an estimated seven in 1900 to 
thirty-nine by the late 1940's and to forty-five by 1959.4 
This proliferation in both the number and quantity of 
industrially essential raw minerals has introduced several 
problems for the modern nation; problems primarily arising 
from the varying levels of industrialization and develop-
ment within the consuming and producing nations. The first 
of these problems is the accelerating demand for all min-
eral resources. The second is a realization of the unequal 
distribution of recoverable supplies of these same mineral resources. 
The result is that industrailized nations must continuously seek 
new sources of raw minerals to support the industrial and 
economic base of their economies. A further conse-
quence is t~at industrialized nations must seek these 
supplies from a limited number of sources, some of 
8 
which are often geographically remote and/or located 
within another sovereign nation. These conditions in 
turn require international trade to facilitate the 
acquisition of necessary mineral resources and establishes 
a mutual interdependence among nations. This interdepend-
ence was recognized as early as 1939 when no nation was 
considered totally self-reliant in essential minerals. 5 
Since that time, interdependence among nations has 
increased. 
The international dependence in minerals has histor-
ically introduced some potentially serious problems for 
the consuming nation. These problems have largely in-
volved effort~ by the producer or_third parties to 
interrupt or limit essential mineral supplies to gain 
political, military or economic advantage at the expense 
of the consuming nation, Such interruptions and limits 
have occurred in both times of peace and war and have 
involved a wide variety of methods from overt military 
action to quotas and price manipulations. Some examples 
will clarify this point. The interdiction of bauxite 
convoys from South America by German submarines during 
World War II is an excellent example of denial to attain 
military advantage, German submarines sank 96 vessels and 
produced serious short run shortages of aluminum which, 
at that time, was vital to the United States' war effort. 6 
9 
·A more recent·example is the attempts by certain copper 
producing nation_s to increase the price of copper. on the 
international markets.through cartel-like action,s, This· 
action attempted to use.an existing internationi!.l depend.;; 
ence in.copper ,to gain an.economic advantage of increased,-, 
revenue to the ~upply~ng nations~ Other examples can be 
given, to demonstrate acts designed to yield political : .. 
advantage. However, the citing of spebifi~. examples ,is . 
less important'than the realization that-interdependence_ 
•" - . 
. in resources increases the wlnerability o~ a nation. to.· 
outside infiuence. 
Now that a brief historical basis for· the problem has · 
been presented, a review of some specific trend projeci"." · 
. . . . . . . , 
tions in the demand and supply of raw minerals is in; 
. . . 
-·. order.· These trend prc,jections are for, the United· States•· 
. production _and con,suinption '.rot. the period 19?2 to. 200(): ,:, • 
... · . .. .· . . . ,._ . ,, . . .- . 
. ' 
They ~re ba~ed ··on Bu~au of Mines I. projections and weie' •. ' ·. ; ,,,_ . ,, 
• • • ., ; • : •• ' : • ·-· - • • • ' • • • : • • : " ;-~- • : < ·, • ' '" ': • • • : ·, • 
extracted f;-om -two Department. of Def~ns"e ,sponsori,d . . ' ' . . . 
·• studies, . 
Tne first i~ a 19?5 study entitled Strat~gic. Resour~es 
. ~nd. N~ti~nai-security1 . An Initial :Aasessm~nt. Thill study 
. was cond1,1cted by· t·he Stanford Resear_ch Institute. under . · 
. ' ,. '. . .. ' . . 
· government· contract· and cove~ed a total'· of. ?4 different 
mii:ieral· resou~be~ used · thr6ughout: the. United States 1. 
. -





. '.' .. • -; .· . 
the consumption of 70 of these minerals by the year 
2000. 7 It also ranked the 74 minerals according to their 
estimated importance to the economy as a whole and. again 
according to their importance to national security. These 
categories will be used to project mineral demands for the 
upcoming 28 years• The estimated demand of all 70 miner-
als J the estimated demand. of the 20 minerals considered 
most important to the economy, including national security 
uses, and, the 20 minerals considered most important 
solely from national security criteria. These categories 
were chosen to determine if significant differences are 
expected to develop between the aggregate demand and de-
mand within the two specialized demand categories. The 
decision to consider only the 20 most important minerals 
in the two specialized categories was arbitrary. 
From Table 1, the mean increase in demand for all 70 
minerals is projected to be approximately 2.2 times 
during the 28 year period. This growth rate closely 
parallels the 2,06 mean increase expected for the 20 
minerals ranked most important to the economy as a whole, 
but is somewhat higher than the 1,95 increase projected 
for the 20 minerals most essential to national security 
(Table 2). Prom these projected changes, it is obvious 
that the average demand is expected to increase at about 
7fo per year throughout the 28 year period, regardless of 
11 
TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION PROJECTIONS 1972-2000 
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• .5 f • .5 
.5 1.5 
• 7 1. J 
1.0 1.0 
• .5 1.5 
.J 1.8 
.8 1.2 




• 5 1 • .5 
• 7 1.4 
.8 ~ 
4J7o 90.0 
PROJECTED CHANGE 96.6 ~ 4J.6 = 2.2 . 
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(Table 1 - cont'd) 
~OTE: Actual quantities have been converted to a constant unit 
for each mineral in Table 1 to facilitate direct unit 
comparison. 
SOURCE; Strategic Resources and National Security: An 




UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION PROJECTIONS, 
'j:'WENTY.MOST CRITICAL MINERALS 19?2-2000 
CRITICAL TO DEMAND CRITICAL TO 
NA,IONAL 12ll 2000 NAT!ONil ~ECURITY & 
· SECUR!TY ECON5MIC.ACTIVfTY 
MICA (Sheet) 2.7 ,'3 ALUMINUM 
MANGANESE ,? 1.3 IRON 
PLATINUM GP ' •. ,? 1.3 MAGANESE 
MERCURY .s 1,2 GRAPHITE 
. TUNGSTEN .4 1~6 COPPER 
CHROMIUM ,5 . 1.l YTTRIUM 
ANTINOMY· ,5. '.2. CHROMIUM 
.. TANTALUM ,.?·.' 1,3 PLATINUM GROUP 
FLUORINE 
.. • 4 ,. 1.8 TUNGSTEN· 
GRAPHITE ·1.0, : 1'0 ' . MICA (Sheet) ,, 
COBALT · ,? 1.3 NICKEL 
ALUMINUM ,4,•. 2,3 ANTINOMY 
TIN ·~8 1.2 COBALT 
SILVER ;6 1.4 FLUORINE 
NICKEL '. ?. 1.3 MERCURY 
CESIUM .J 1,? SILVER 
·ASBESTOS :i, 1.5 TANTALUM COLUMBIUM. 1~5 TIN 




• 5· 1',2 
. ·,:7 1!3, .. 
1.0 1·.o ,. 
.5 1.5 
,5 · 1,5 ,,, 
.5 1.5 
,7 1,J 
.• 4 1~6 ,. ' 
2.7 .J 
,? 1.i 
• 5 . ·2 • ,. 





.8 ·1 2· .. 
No Estimate· LITH:tiJM 
YTTRIUM ~. ·...L..i ASBE.STOS ...-,S_"'.:.!:u· ·.-.• 
1),j .. 27.4 _13.9 26,9; 
",--' 
' 
·. F ... 
" 
. ,• .. ' PROJECTED· - . 
CHANGE.2?,4!.13,J'= 2',o6 .. PROJECTED CHANGE 26;9=- ij~ 9:::1;95 . •· 
SOURCE, ·. S'j;rate'gic Re~ources 
·Initial· Assessment, 
April 19?5, .: 
i4 
: . ' •. ' .· ... 
3.ncl National Securi_tyi . Ari .· 
Stanford Research Ins.ti tute, · 
'. . . . ' . 
.. 
';. ' . 
., •• i•· 
"' -·· ,. ,•' .. 
.. ·,1 : 
demand category~ 
. The consumption figures.presented above raise the 
possibility tha"t .. physical short~ges of one or more essen-
tial mine·rals ma.y occur by the end of this century: The . 
data.in T°able J expresses supply as a ratio of recoverable 
reserves to cumulative demand by the year 2000 for J2. 
important· nlinerals an~ further supports this conclusion. 8 
' . . ' . 
For. Etxainple, · United States i· recoverable reserves equal· one 
half or le·ss of projected cumulative demand ·for 24 of the 
32· minerals studie_d, Perhaps more importantly, the United 
States has no recoverable reserves of t2 of these minerals 
and has recoverable reserves of 0,2 or less. of the.cumula-. 
tive demand for 17 of the 20 minerals. _previously ranked 
highest on the ~riteria of national sec~rity impor:tance 
and on the combined criteria of nati_onal security and· 
, economi_c i!J1pac;t, Tlie :conclusion fJ:'Om these ~igurei;; is , . 
. . . . . ·, ,· .: ·.: 
· that. the United s'tates is .presently deficient in re~over-
able reserves of many niinerais and:this,de~iclency is· 
·. ' .. _. . ' , 
expecte_d to ,increase throughout the remainder of the 
century, 
One a·ddi ti onal fact emerges from Table J, This is 
the heavy reliance of-the United States on imported· 
mineral resources. · In 19?3, . the United States. impo,rtec;I. : .. ·. 
,. ' . 
more·-than· 50% ·.of 22 of the J2 minerals listed; with 190% 
. ·., . 
· of 5 of these mirierals · deri ve·d ·through import. Qther . 
·15 
TABLE 3 
RATIO OF UNITED STATES RECOVERABLE RESERVES TO 



































































SOURCE: Report, Review of Government and Industry 
Studies on Materials Supply and Shortages, 
Edward J. Dykman, Materials Department, 
Ship Research and Development Center, 
16 December 1974. 
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sources identify this as a worsening trend by pointing 
out that within the past two decades net imports have 
grown from 11 to 15% of the total domestic consumption. 9 
While this importation may represent only the use of more 
readily recoverable reserves rather than actual domestic 
shortages of reserves, it does highlight the United States• 
relative dependency position in mineral supply. 
A summary of the mineral position of the United 
States indicates a present dependence on foreign sources 
for several essential minerals. It further indicates 
that scarcity of minerals is likely to increase by the 
end of this century. The potential scarcity arises be-
cause the United States is either physically without 
reserves of these minerals or possesses reserves that are 
unsuitable for recovery with present technology and 
economic conditions. Further, the United States is in-
creasingly relying on import of minerals to meet her 
military and economic requirements, thus lessening domes-
tic self-sufficiency. This approach makes the United 
States potentially vulnerable to political, military or 
economic influence by a foreign nation or group of nations 
through termination or limitation of vital mineral re-
source supplies. For this reason, each mineral resource 
which is important to our national economy and security 
must be evaluated with the intent of insuring an adequate 
17 
continuing supply of these minerals. This study will 
undertake such an analysis for three such minerals; 





This chapter outlines some general uses of chromium 
within the United States at large. It then previews some 
important specific uses of chromium by three industries 
which support both the commercial and military sectors 
of the nation and which account for 96~ of total chromium 
consumption within the United States. Projections of 
international, national and military demand are then 
presented along with current and projected reserves of 
chromium ore. The constraints on availability of chro-
mium and the possibilities of substitution are also 
reviewed. Finally, some actions taken to date to alle-
viate constraints on supplies are reviewed and 
recommendations for future policies and actions are made. 
Chromium i s a white, crystalline, very hard metallic 
chemical element with a high resistance to corrosion. 
Chromite is the mineral ore f rom which all chromium is 
obtained. Chromite ore contains variable amounts of 
chromium (chromic oxide, cr2o3), iron and aluminum, with 
other elements such as silica present in lesser amounts. 
19 
The ratio of chromium to iron in the ore, the amount of 
non-chromium bearing material in the chromite ore, and 
the physical character of the ore all determine the grade 
and uses of the ore . Three grades of chromite ore with 
corresponding uses are recognized. They are the metallur-
gical, chemical and refractory grades. 
General Uses of Chromium 
Chromium has attained an increasingly wide variety 
of uses throughout the United States ' economy. These 
uses include metallurgical, chemical and refractory 
applications affecting a variety of products which are 
wholly or in part derived from chromium. The following 
list was presented in a 19 75 study entitled Strategic 
Resources and National Security: An Initial Assessment, 
and is ao excellent example of the many uses of chromium. 
Uses: Steel for motor vehicles, railroads, 
ships, jet engine parts. Stainless steel trim, 
hardware, fixtures . Structural steel as beams, 
decking , fencing, reinforcing . Pumps , tanks, 
pipe, tubes. Refinery, mining, chemical plant 
equipment. Tools. Domestic stainless steel 
products . Chromium plated appliances. Furnace 
linings, refractories. Plating. Yellow traffic 
paints , metal coatings. Treatment of hides, 
tanning operations , textile dyes. Corrosion 
inhibitors . Catalysts, drilling mud and com-
pounds. Surgical metal . Mold and core making.l 
This listing highlights the pervasiveness of chromium de-
rived products in a modern industrialized economy, but 
fails to adequately recognize their criticalness. To 
20 
unde rstand this criticalness, it is necessary to r e v iew 
the different ores of chromium and to explore their use 
within the thre e primary consuming categories, the 
metallurgical, chemical and r e fractory. Table 5 summa-
arizes chromite ore consumption by consumer group in the 
United States from 1963 through 1972 in the following 
grades: 
1. Metallurgical Grade: About 50% chromic oxide, 
cr203, a chrome to iron ratio, Cr/Fe, of over 3/1 and 
a hard lump physical nature. 
Metallurgical uses account for over 60% of 
total chromium consumption and are increasing at 
approximately 5% per year. Metallurgical grade ore is 
converted to ferrochrome alloys which are used in the 
production of stainless steel, specialized alloy steels, 
including tool steel, and into various high-strength 
low alloy steels. Of these end items, stainless steel 
production is the most common, accounting for 66% of 
ferrochrome consumption. The specialized alloy steels 
are second in importance accounting for between 19 and 
24% of chromium consumption within the metallurgical 
sector. The remaining 10 to 15% is alloyed with other 
metals to form high strengt h low alloy steels with 
exceptional heat and corrosion resistant qualities. 
Chromium offers special advantages in each of 
21 
these product categories that is mot available from 
substitutes or is available with some performance or 
cost penalty, These inturn create special .difficulties 
should the supply of chromium be interrupted. For ex-
ample, stainless steel has many uses throughout the 
military and industrial sectors because of its unique 
resistance to corrosion. Yet, stainless steel can not be 
produced without the use of chromium. In the alloy 
steels chromium both hardens and strengthens the basic 
steel. The various specialized ailoys are mainly used 
in non-strategic applications in construction (22%), 
automotive (22%), general purpose industrial equipment 
(12%), steel, service centers (11_.5%), power generating 
and distribution equipment (7.7%), rail transportation 
(5%), and forgings (5%) • 2 The high strength low alloy 
steels are formed by combining chromium with other 
elements such as nickel, cobalt and iron to produce ex-
cellent heat and corrosion resistant materials. Such 
materials have been employed in two major industries, 
aerospace and petrochemical. Other substantial uses· 
are in the manufacturing of heat treating equipment, 
stationary gas turbines and marine transportation equip-
ment. Aerospace applications include wrought products 
and castings for aircraft airframes and engines. Like the 
production of stainless steel, no substitutes are known. 
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for chromium in some of thes e critical applications. 3 
In summary, certain non-strategic uses of 
chromium may either be substituted for or discontinued 
in times of national emergencies. However, applications 
that require corrosion resistance and those necessitating 
extreme hardening or heat resistance continue to demand 
an· assured supply of chrom1um. 
2. Chemical Grades About 45~ chromic oxide, Cr2o3, 
with 5~ maximum silica, Sio2 , content. All ore shall be 
of a friable (easily crushed or crumbled into a powder) 
nature. 
Chemical uses accounted for 16~ of total chromium 
consumption by 1968 and were increasing at about 2.51' 
per year. Chemical grade chromium is primarily used in 
the fonn of sodium bichromate in pigments, plating, 
leather tanning, wood and water treatment, and numerous 
other lesser applications. Chromium pigments consume 
about one-third of the sodium bichromate used annually 
and are found in inks, paints and roofing shingles. 
This market is growing at about 2.5~ per year. About 
one-fifth of the chemical chromium is used for decora-
tive plating of consumer goods and for hard chromium 
plating of machine tools. This market is growing at 
over 31' per year. Leather tanning uses about 1~ of all 
chemical grade chromium but is declining because of a 
2J 
reduced demand for leather. The remaining. miscellaneous 
applications are as a corrosion inhibitor for metals, 
muds used in petroleum drilling operations, catalysts in 
various chemical processes, textile dyes, pharmaceutical 
chemicals, and water and wood treatment agents. These 
uses have in general shown a slow but steady growth 
trend and present a continuing, if not critical, demand 
for chemical grade chromium. 
J. Refractory Grades About 34% chromic oxide, Cr2o3, 
various other oxides of aluminum, silicone, calcium, and 
magnesium. All ore shall be hard lump in nature. 
Refractory grade chromium is primarily formed 
into bricks and used for melting furnace linings in the 
open hearth steel producing furnace. It also has some 
limited uses in newer electric furnaces used for indus-
trial heating applications as well as in the production 
of steel. Refractory uses accounted for 19" of total 
chromium consumption by 1968, but have been declining at 
about 5% per yea~ as open hearth steel making is replaced 
by other methods. As this trend continues, refractory 
grade chromium becomes less vital to the continued 
military and commercial well being of the United States. 
Demand 
The basic types of chromium consumed within the 
United States have been reviewed, including the general 
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use s wi t h i n t he t hree c on suming sections. It i s now 
time to quantif y these uses whe r e po s sible to det ermine 
the d emand for c hromium. To do this, t he study wi ll 
first pre sent the current consumption of chromium both 
nationally and internationally and then project these 
levels of consumption through the year 2000 . Finally , 
the uses of chromium by the defense sector projected for 
this same time frame will be explored . 
National Demand. The United States consumed 900,000 
short tons of chromi t e ores and 320,000 short tons of 
intermediate ferrochrome a lloys in 1975. The metallur-
gical industry accounted for 64 % of consumption , 
r e fractories . 20% and chemicals lq%. By end item use, 
consumption was construction 22 %, transportation 16 %, 
machinery and equipment 14 %, refractories 14% and all 
other uses 34 %. Table 4 ind i cates the actual United 
States ' consumption of chromite ores and intermediate 
ferrochrome alloys from 1965 through 1975. Table 5 
f ur t he r defines the consumption of c hromi te ores by 
industry from 1965-1972. These tables collectivel y in-
dicate a gradual increase in the consumption of 
chromium which reached a maximum in 1974. In 1975 
a c tual consumption declined in each industry compared 
with that of 1974, however, aggregate imports continued 
strong with consumer stocks increasing by approximately 66%. 
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TABLE 4 
UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION OP CHROMITE ORE 
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SOURCE• U.S. Bureau or Mines, Minerals Yearbook. Volume 1, 
Metals Minerals and Fuels, Various Years 
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TABLE 5 
CONSUMPTION OF CHROMITE ORE BY PRIMARY CONSUMER 
GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1,000 TONS) 
METALLURGICAL REFRACTORY CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRY INDUSTRY INDUSTRY TOTAL 
YEAR GROSS WEIGHT GROSS WEIGHT GROSS WEIGHT GROSS WEIGHT 
1972 727 224 189 1140 
1971 720 193 180 1093 
1970 912 278 213 1403 
1969 898 302 211 1411 
1968 804 311 202 1316 
1967 866 310 179 1355 
1966 828 439 194 1461 
1965 907 460 217 1584 
1964 832 430 189 1451 
1963 632 368 187 1187 
(1) Data may not add to total shown due to independent 
rounding. 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, Vol. 1, 
Metals Minerals and Fuels, Various Years. 
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The future demand for chromium can be expected to 
continue this increase both because of new uses for stain-
less and specialized steels and because of the continued 
expansion of existing uses. The Federal Preparedness 
Agency of the General Services Administration projects 
the United States• demand for primary chromium will in-
crease by 2.1~ through 1980 and by 2.&,C from 1980-2000. 
They further estimate that, depending upon the demand 
for stainless steel and the relative price of major sub-
stitutes, the bulk of growth will probably occur in the 
metallurgical uses with little or no growth in chemical 
and refractory use. 
International ,Demand. International demand as ex-
pressed in world. production of chromite ore has increased 
by over J?.' in the period 1965-1975 {Table 6). This de-
mand ·as estimated by the Federal Preparedness Agency will 
increase at a 2.8% annual rate through the end of the 
century . as the und.erdeveloped and lesser developed nations 
become more industrialized. 
Military Demand .for Chromium. Chromium is indirectly 
of significant importance to the maintenance of a modern 
military. Chromium usage by the military closely paral-
lels that of the civilian economy. A variety of chromium 
based alloy steels are used in transportation systems, 
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SOURCE• U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, Volume 1, 
Metals Minerals and Fuels, Various Years 
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employed throughout the mi litary establishment. The 
same indirect support relationship exists to a lesser 
degree for the chemical and refractory uses of chromium 
through paints, dyes, corrosion inhibitors, catalysts 
and refractory products. 
Government sponsored research indicates that an 
average of 8.2~ of the United States• consumption of 
chromium between 196J and 19?2 was devoted to defense 
uses (Table?). This table further indicates an approx-
imately stable ratio of defense to total consumption 
throughout the period. The authors found no specific 
projections of the future defense demand for chromium 
and assume none has been made because of its indirect 
use within the military. 
Current Reserves. Based on geological survey, the 
1962 free world reserves of chromite ore were estimated 
at 2,650,000,000 long tons. 4 This estimate was essen-
tially duplicated in 1965 by the United States Bureau of 
Mines and the authors found few indications that it has 
officially been further revised. This amount is perhaps 
more meaningfully expressed as 1.4 times the estimated 
cumulative world demand for chromite ore between the 
year 1972 and the year 2000. 5 Table 8 identifies those 
free world nations with known reserves of chromite ore. 
It is important to note that South Africa (2,000,000,0000 
)0 
TABLE 7 
UNITED STATES DEMAND FOR 
CHROMIUM USED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES 
(1,000 TONS) 
CHROMITE INTERMEDIATE PERCENT OF 
YEAR ORES FERROCHROMES U.S. DEMAND 
1963 11B.7 31.0 10 
1964 101.6 26.4 7 
1965 94 •. 9 23.7 6 
1966 116.9 33.3 B 
1967 135 .. 5 36.8 10 
1968 131. 6 36.0 10 
1969 112.9 31. 0 8 
1970 112.2 27.4 8 
1971 98.4 29.1 9 
1972 79.8 27.4 7 
TEN YEAR MEAN IN DEFENSE USE - 8.2% 
SOURCE: Strategic Resources and· Nation s'ecurity: An 
Initial Assessment, Standford Research Institute, 
April 1975 
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tons) and Rhodesia (600,000,000 tons ) totally dominate 
the currently available free world reserves while the 
United States possesses essentially negligible reserves. 
Equally important to the total supply picture is the tact 
that the reserves of the Soviet Union and other Communist 
nations are unknown, even though the Soviet Union has 
supplied approximately one third of the world chromite 
ore for a decade. 
Location of Reserves 
Metallurgical grade chromite ores are found mainly in 
the Soviet Union, Rhodesia, and Turkey. South Africa re-
serves are primarily chemical grade while refractory 
grade ores come almost exclusively from the Philippines. 
A detailed survey of the actual sources and uses of 
chromite ore in 1967 is provided by Tables 8 and 9. By 
location, South Africa contains an estimated 6.3% of known 
free world reserves while .Rhodesia has an estimated J2".6 
One additional implication of reserves must be 
evaluated. This is the fact that reserves are subject 
to change as certain market conditions change. To under-
stand this condition, we must review the difference between 
reserves and resources and the possibility that resources 
may become proven reserves under certain circumstances. 
By definition, reserves are well defined and economically 
recoverable under existing conditions of price and 
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TABLE. 8 
ESTIMATED FREE WORLD RESERVES OF CHROMITE 
(Thousand Long Tons) 
HIGHEST GRADE(!) HIGH( 2 ) 
HIGH IRON(J) 
HIGH(4 ) 
COUNTRY fQTAL METALLURGIC&!, CHR(IIIUM ALUMINUM 
So. Africa, 
Rep. of 2,000,000 100,000 1,900,000 
Rhodesia 600,0,00 (Total of both grad,s - J00 , 000 
J00,000 
Turkey 10,000 9,000 1,000 
United States 8,000 400 7,400 200 
\..-.> 
\..-.> Philippines 7,500 1,.500 6,000 
Finland 7,500 7,500 
Canada 5,000 5,000 
India 2,000 1,200 800 
Melagasy Rep. 2,000 2,000 
Iran 1,000 1,000 
Other J1J~O 
FREI WORLD 
2aJ2S 20Q 825 
TOTAL 2,646,-JSO 417,425 2,220,100 8,825 
(Table 8 - cont• d) 
(1) 45?' Minimum cr2o3, MinimUDI .3/1 Cr/Fe. This is the 
primary ore used· for metallurgical purposes which . 
account for over 60% of all chromite consumption • 
. (2) 45% Minimum Cr2o3
, Minimum 2/1 Cr/Fe, 
' (.3) · 40%. Cr2o3, Less than 2/1 Cr/Fe. 
(4). 20% Minimwn,A12o3
, Ref'L'ac.tory usage, 
S0URCE.1 · Study, Trends in the Usage of Chromium• . National 
Research Council, Materials Advisory Board, 





PRINCIPAL SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS OF CHROMITE IN U.S., 1967 
AVERAGE" Cr2o3 ORE USAGE 
PRINCIPAL RESERVES 
GBADE OF ORE IN ORE iN 1000 SHORT TONS OF ORE 
Metallurgical 50. 3" . 818<1 ) 
77% of net ore, Cr/Fe J/1 - Rhodesia, Russia, Turkey 
14" o:f net ore, Cr/Fe= 2/1 to J/1 Rho~esia, Russia, Turkey, 
South Africa 
9-' of net ore; Cr/Fe 2/1 - South Afrlca 
Chemical 45.2% 234< 2 > South Africa, Rhodes ia 
Refractory J4.o% J4o<J> Phillippines 
{1) Actual usage ot 50.3" ore. Ferroalloys also used 42,000 tons of chemical 
grade and 30,000 tons of refractory grade. Direct melting used lJ,000 
tons of chemical grade . These make totals of all ores for metallurgical 
usage equal to 903,000 t ons . 
(2) Actual usage of 45 .2" ore. Of this, 55,000 tons went to metallurgical 
uses, including 42,000 tons to ferroalloys and 1),000 tons to direct 
melt additions. 
(J) Actual usage of .)4.°" ore. Of this, )0,000 tons went into ferroalloys 
for metallurgical uses. 
SOURCE, Study, ireids in the Usue of fhromium, National Research Council, 
Materia advisory Board; Wash ngton, May 1970, Publication NMAB-2;6. 
technology. Resources are normally not as well defined 
and d.o not share the requirement of being economically 
recoverable under existing price and technological condi-
tions. Thus, proven reserves are distinctly liinited 
while resources ultimately can encompass the total quan-
tity of an element found in the earth's crust. Hcwever, 
by their definition reserves are capable of expansion or 
contraction as ei~her price or technology changes, 
. Historically; the vast majority of such changes have 
favored. an increase in .the reserves of most minerals. 
For example• one estimate has indicated that world proven 
reseryes of chromium have increased by 650% during the 
twenty years from 1950 to 1970, 7 This !'las occurred-in 
splte of a United States price decrease of 45% during 
the period of 1950 to 1973. 8 While this exact condition 
is unlikely tob~ repeated, it is likely that the 1>roven. 
·. reserves of chrcnni te ore will continue to increase. for . 
_some time, Thi1i°.is so for several reasons. · First, the 
price of chromite or~ ,is likely to increase as continued· 
· demanli approaches available supply. This will make it 
economically feasible 'to explore and develop deposits of 
·1ower. grade ores which may then be_ profitably mined. 
Second, the distribution of mineral deposits tends to be 
such that as the ave~ge quality of a deposit declines,· 
the tonnages of ore that a:re available increase 
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substantially. Hense, as industries move to lower quality 
deposits, mineable at higher prices, sharply increasing 
tonnages of ore become available. 9 Third, technological 
developments may occur which will make it possible to 
extract what are presently uneconomically recoverable re-
serves. The implication of these conditions is that 
while presently unquantifiable, the proven reserves of 
chromite and other ores appear certain to increase as 
price increases and technological change occur. 
Geopolitical Concerns 
The geographic distribution of currently known re-
serves of chromite ore occur only on the Asian and 
African continents and in the Philippines Archipelago. 
There are no known economically recoverable reserves in 
the Western Hemisphere. The United States has potentially 
large reserves of low grade ores which are uneconomical 
to exploit under existing price and technological condi-
tions, although they have been mined under past war-time 
conditions at artificially supported prices. The United 
States ceased domestic production of chromium under the 
artificially inflated prices of the Government Defense 
Production Act in 1961. Since that time, 100% of re-
quirements of both chromite ores and intermediate 
ferrochrome metals have been obtained from foreign 
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sources. This d.ependence makes the United States pote_n~ 
-tial;y W:lnerabie to geopolitical as well as. econ~mic . 
constraints· .from ·th! producing nations. The possibility 
of such constraints being used against the United States' . 
is enhanced_ by· .the very small number of nations which 
· dominate .the production of chromite ore arid the fact that . . 
the Soviet Union; a major ideological and political rivai,. 
. . . ' 
is·· als.o a major ~upplier of high grade . chromite ore. · . . ' ., . . .. . 
···The Unite~ States impo_rted an average ot.1,191,000 .. 
-short. ·tons per year of ail · grades of chromite , ore from 
1968 . through. 19_72. In 1973, ti ve· nations° supplied . 
approximately 8~ ~f tlie chromite ore imported by.the 
United States. They were the Union of South Africa (Jl")~ 
the Soviet Union (21~), Rhodesia (13"), Turkey (11"), an~ . 
the._Philippines (11")· io 'Th~s~ five nations have ~~Cl .... 
suppiied the majority of the chromite ore to. the Uni teci . > 
_, .• , .· - ·. , . . .... 
State·s t_or the past.· decade, al though the relative market, . : · . 
. ', . .. \-: : ' ,, :,·:· .; . . . . . . ' .. : ·:.' ' . . '. . ,,,, , .. ·-
sh~re of _soine of '.the13·!' nations• has shown wide :vari'.ations: . 
for.ot~er·thaneconomic conditions. Other nations such 
as Japan, Finl~d.· afid. West Germ~ have also pr~vid.ed .. ., ~ ' ,· . 
substantial impo~ti:i ot int.ermediate fe~rochrones throug!J-
-- ' . . . ' . ; ' . '• . " :; ~ 
·out-this same period., However,: these countriesi·.like, 
: . ' . . ' . . . ' ,. 
-the Urii ted Stat~s; 'la~k domestic reserves of chromite ' . .. ' . . ' . . .. ·-
. ores ~d ~e ~ependent on the' f'i VJ major o~e producers 
tor :,their -essential raw materials,. T):iese . con# t.ions 
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make it important that the United States maintain 
favorable political and economic relations with these 
ore producing nations both individually and as a group. 
For this reason it is appropriate to briefly review cer-
tain critical issues which have hindered United States• 
relations with these ore producing nations in the past. 
Rhodesia. Rhodesia has a relatively advanced ecor1omy 
which depends to a large degree on its domestic policy of 
racial separatism for its continued economic well being. 
The United Nations imposed mandatory economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia in early 1967, following Rhodesia's 
unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 
November 1965. These sanctions banned all major imports 
and e,cports from Rhodesia, except those for humanitarian 
purposes, in an attempt to force Rhodesia to abandon her 
policy of white supremacy. These sanctions effectively 
severed Rhodesia's commercial and financial contacts 
with most major trading partners, except South Africa, 
and severely weakened her economy. For example, in 1971, 
Rhodesia experienced a balance-of-payments deficit of 
$Rl8.6 million {$21,5 million), one of the largest ever 
recorded in the history of the territory. 11 The United 
States honored these sanctions from their imposition 
until 1972, when she resumed importation of minerals 
from Rhodesia including chromite ores and intermediate 
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ferrochrornes. This importation was accomplished unilater-
ally under the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement 
Act of 1971 an~ H~~~ ~ot indicate any abatement of United 
-;~..1,. " 
States/Rhodesian problems arising from the racial suprem-
acy issue. Rather, it reflects a purely economic 
adjustment in spite of the underlying racial problems. 
This solution is p robably unstable in the long run and 
indicates that further disruptions of relations between 
the two nations, with possible adverse impact on mineral 
sup; lies, appears likely. 
Republic of South Africa. South Africa has institu-
tionalized a similar policy of racial separation or 
apartheid in its own territory and that of Namibia, 
formerly South West Africa. Like Rhodesia, this has led 
to a growi ng restriction of South Africa's international 
contacts, i ncluding those within the United Nations 
General Assembly. The 1974 sessi on condemned the policy 
and practice of racial supremacy by South Africa and 
recommended universally applied economic sanctions as 
the only means of achieving a peaceful solution to the 
problem. 12 The United Nations failed to impose sanctions 
but continued t he embargo of the sale and shipment of 
arms, ammunition , military vehicles and related equip-
ment and materials which it had initially imposed in 
196). The United States fully supported this embargo 
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while maintaining generally friendly political and 
economic relations with South Africa. Throughout this 
time; the South African eco.nomy has remained strong due 
to her excellent natural resource base which includes 
65% of the annual world gold output, 70% of the world's 
platinum reserves, 60% of all diamonds, 75% of chromium 
reserves, and JO% of all proven deposits of uranium, 13 
A fundamental problem in relying on South Africa as a 
source of nee.ded minerals is the long-run viability of 
its internal policy of apartheid or racial separatism, 
Increasing concern in this area is be°ing expressed by 
both white and non-white South Africans. The territorial 
segregation of the population into black homelands or 
"Bantustans" is likely to result in further political 
and economic problems. Economic~lly, white South 
Africa needs the black labor force and the Bantustans 
need the state's.economic support, Politically, these 
homelands can be used as a platform for agitation and 
the .expression of 
in South Africa's 
dissatisfaction with the role of blacks 
. 14-
future. Many international orpaniza-
tions, including .. the United, Nations and the Organization 
for African Unity, have condemned South.Africa for this 
policy, While some attempts have recently been made to 
establish racial policies more attuned to present day 
realities, few results have been attained and considerable 
4-1 
growing dissatisfaction exists both internally and inter-
nationally. 
Political turmoil or internal conflict could easily 
lead to significant problems in the mining industry which 
is highly dependent on the black labor force. An inter-
. national conflict could have an even more significant 
and long lasting effect. Such a conflict is not wholly 
unlikely, p~rticularly in view of the recent Communist 
inspired and Cuban supported war between Mozambique and 
Rhodesia. This type of movement could easily be turned 
against South Africa because of its policy of apartheid 
or its refusal to permit the independence of Namibia 
(South West Africa) as requested by the United Nations. 
' . 
A major conflict in South Africa would impact all indus-
trialized nations that rely on the wide variety of 
minerals exported by South Africa. These problems might 
be caused by labor strife, destruction of plant facilities, 
disruption of transportation facilities or by a combina-
tion of these and many other factors. But, possibly the 
most serious long term impact of a major racial conflict 
would be the loss to south Africa of a significant por-
tion of the technical and managerial expertise needed to 
maintain its relatively high level of industrialization. 
Another result of these conditions might be an ex-
pansion of the mutual interdependence between Rhodesia 
42 
and South Africa in economic and. domestic matters to 
circumvent the United Nations' sanctions against 
Rhodesia . 15 Whatever the outcome, these appear to have 
largely been political and moralistic problems which have 
created short tenn disruptions in relations between South 
Africa and the remainder of the international community. 
While they are highly destablizing in the short run, 
they only moderately pose a threat to the continuing 
long run supply of chromite ore and ferrochromes to the 
United States. 
The Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is clearly the 
second major producer of chromite ore and therefore a 
most important geopolitical concern of United States' 
mineral resource policies. Since 1917, Soviet foreign 
trade has been a State monopoly managed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade within the overall national economic 
plan.16 As a State controlled enterprise, the Soviets 
have increased their share of the total chromite market 
to JO-JS% by the 1965-1968 time frame with an output of 
85% high grade metallurgical ore and 15~ refractory grade 
ore. 17 These increases occurred at a time when the 
United States was observing economic sanctions against 
• Rhodesia over her policy of racial separation. These 
sanctions created an artificial shortage of chromium in 
the non-Communist world and afforded the Sovfet Union an 
4J 
opportunity for expansion of her share of the chromite 
market, It also pennitted t he Soviet s to substantially 
increase the price of her chromium exports to the United 
States. For example, low carbon ferrochrome increased 
in price by 65% between January 1969 and January 1971, 
while the price of chrome silicone increased 56% from 
January 1969 to July 1970.18 This price increase obvi-
ously occurred to take advantage of the existing 
artificial shortage of chromium in the non-Communist 
world, but may also have supported other Soviet objec-
tives at that time. For example, it may have been used 
to build up the Soviet's reserves of hard currencies for 
use in subsequent trading actions with Western nations. 
It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the 
ideological, political or economic differences that exist 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. These 
differences are significant and well beyond the scope of 
this paper, but suffice it to say that in today's world 
the Soviet Union is the primary ideological and political 
adversary of the United States. As such, the United 
States could easily be denied access to this source of 
supply on short notice f or what could be prolonged periods 
of time. These disruptions in the flow of materials 
could be as a result of ideological or political con-
frontations well short of armed conflict. Although 
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tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States 
have been lowered significantly in the past few years 
and economic activity between the two nations has risen, 
it would still be presumpt uous today to consider the 
Soviet Union as a reliable source of minerals. 
For example, an attempt by t he Soviet Union to 
arbitrarily withhold chromite from the world markets is 
considered a possibility. 19 However, the likelihood of 
this occurring has severely diminished with the resump-
tion of imports of chromite ore from Rhodesia and the 
continuing purchase of food grains from the United States 
by the Soviets. Recent technological improvements have 
also lessened the potential impact of any reduction in 
Soviet chromite production by making it possible to use 
lower quality chemical grade ores in certain metallurgical 
applications. Thus, while certain geopoli-tical constraints 
could theoretically be invoked by the Soviet Union, their 
impact on the United States chromium supplies would not 
have the disruptive effect that such actions wo~ld have 
had during the embargo against Rhodesian ores. Therefore, 
they will probably not be applied in the immediate future. 
Turkey. Turkey has been a long time ally of the non-
Communist world and is a founding member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. As such, she generally 
supported the United States and other Western powers until 
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the mid-1960's in an attempt to insure continued Turkish 
independence, particularly from the Soviet Union. Since 
that time, relations with the United Sta tes have cooled. 
The dominant reason for this change has been the question 
of Cyprus. In its simplest t enns , Turkey has felt that 
the United States has not supported Turkish int erests on 
Cyprus while in fact supporting the inter ests of Greece. 
These feelings were exacerbated by United States Congres-
sional action which imposed a ban on mili tary aid to Turkey 
on the grounds that the use of American equipment on 
Cyprus by Turkey violated United States • military aid 
laws. One other less significant issue has troubled 
United States-Turkish relations. That is the lifting of 
the ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy in July 
1974. Neither of these issues has critically damaged 
relations between the two countries, primarily because 
of the continued Turkish desire for freedom from the 
Soviet Union. Therefore,· neither appears likely to re-
sult in the long term loss of mineral imports from Turkey. 
Philippines. The Philippines have traditionally 
held close alliances with the United States. They have 
supported the United States• actions i n Vi et Nam and 
have been strongly anti-Communist. In recent years, this 
support has diminished somewhat due to uncertainty about 
the United States• role in Southeast Asia after the war 
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in Viet Nam and over the extensive United States• military 
rights in the Philippines. This concern has led the 
Philippines to seek a greater independence in foreign 
policy which included the establishment of diplomatic 
and trade relations with a number of Communist countries. 
These new interests appear to reflect the realities of a 
multi-polar world more than a condition likely to result 
in curtailment of trading relations with the United States. 
For these reasons, continued supplies of chromite and 
other commodities ean probably be expected from the 
Philippines. 
This brief review indicates that the United States has 
experienced several specific geopolitical problems with 
the principal su~pliers of chromite ore during the re-
latively recent past. It also indicates that a 
collective pr?blem has occurred with only two of these 
suppliers, Rhodesia and South Africa . This lack of 
unification as regards specific difficulties between the 
United States and the major supplying nations makes a 
meaningful, long-term denial of chromite ore unlikely 
under presently existing international conditions. 
There is, however, one possible exception to this con-
clusion which must be mentioned. That is the extremely 
unlikely occurrance of large scale armed hostilities 
where military intervention would be employed. Should 
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this occur, the distant geographic location of all 
chromite ores and the necessity to trBl'!,sport them by .. 
waterborne carrier cpuld present a seyere lim.i;tation to 
• .,; t 
imports. Many factol'S which are beyonC,. the scope of this . . 
paper would _affect the success of such a campaign. The 
. • .I • • 
purpose,of this paper-is to identify it as a possible 
constraint on ore supplies and suggest it .as an area-
requ_i,'ri.ng _ addi ti~nal :. study. . ,.-
Cartels. Since the possibility of outright denial of. 
chromite is considered highly unlikely,_ what about the - ,. ' 
possib~lityof car~el-like action to significantly in".' 
crease the price of 1'hromite? This too appears highly 
unlikely for se~eral reasons. The most important .being·· 
the character_ of the producing nations themselves, along _ 
_ with the ·nature of, the product. The chromite marke.t 
• )" . .' 1 
realistic~lly · consist~ _ or three_ distinct: sub-markets, . 
inetailur~ic~l; biiellii~al ~d refra~toey / with ii ttle iriter:.: 
.. ~ . . . - . . 
change anlong ,th~m 'until very •recently. · Concurrently • .' 
. . ,- . ·• '. . . 
· _certalr· supp~iers have dom,inated Eipeci1ic .. sub-markets, 
the Philippines producing a majority of refractory 
' .-
grad:e ores while South Africa dominated chemical grade· . . ,• 
produc:tion, - Th_e ·Soviet Union_. Turkey. and Rhodesia ~ve 
sµppli~d the majority :of metallurgical grade ores. This · 
' . . 
initially appears to offer ideal conditions for a cartel~ -· 
. - . ' . . 
like action to s~bstlintially"raise .pl'.ices~. However, 
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this is not the case because of either market considera-
tions or certain producer relationships. The most 
obvious market where cartelization is unlikely is the 
refractory. Here the steadily declining demand and 
transition to readily available new processes which do 
not use chromium would only be accelerated by a signifi-
cant price rise. Many of the same conditions exist in 
the chemical grade markets. While the chemical grade 
market is slowly growing at present prices, there are 
adequate substitutes for most chemical grade uses. 
Also, these substitutes are available at only marginal 
increases in cost or decreases in performance. Therefore, 
significant long term substitution with a concurrent re-
duction in the chemical grade market is likely to occur 
if prices rise significantly. This leaves the most 
important sub-market for consideration, the metallurgical. 
Currently, over 60% of total chromium usage occurs in 
this market. Major producers are the Soviet Union, 
Rhodesia and Turkey. Also, the prospects of substitu-
tion in the major use of metallurgical grade ore, 
stainless steel production, is very low at present. Thus, 
from a market demand standpoint, cartel action can not be 
entirely ignored. Therefore, the producing nations must 
be examined to see if this is likely to occur. To do 
this, we must first emphasize one point. That is, a 
49 
a cartel can successfully increase prices only if it 
restricts output. This implies an agreement among pro-
ducers which "fixes" the total production of chromium 
at a level ,generally lower than would be the 
case without a cartel. For a number of reasons, such 
agreements have historically been extremely difficult to 
maintain. Among these are different production costs 
among cartel members, a strong incentive to cheat by 
individual members, and differences in economic struc-
, 20 
tures and political philosophies among the producers. 
These restraints appear throughout any comparison of the 
Soviet Union, Turkey and Rhodesia and would appear to 
make any cartel-like action most_unlikely. The inclusion 
of South Africa, whose chemical grade ores are increasing-
ly being used for metallurgical applications through new 
technology, would change the outlook somewhat. Rhodesia 
and South Africa have already adopt,ed a largely unified 
political and economic approach because of their common 
racial policies. There is also evidence that Rhodesian 
ores are being re;l;ined into ferrochromes by South 
Africa. Thus, if the Soviet Union provided only tacit 
cooperation, as she has done in the diamond market, some 
level of cartel-like action to raise prices would be 
possible. Whether this will occur and the exact nature 
and magnitude of such an occurrance is another question 
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,-
which can not be answered at this time. 
In summary, cartel action to significantly raise 
prices appears unlikely in either the refractory or 
chemical grade ores and appears as only a remote possi-
bility in the metallurgical markets. 
Substi tuticin ·of Other· Minerals 
The possibility of substitution for chromium is almost 
exclusively dictated by the intended end use of the ore, 
whether metallurgical, chemical o·r. refractory. This is 
in large measure due to the specific characteristics 
imparted by chromium on its end item products such as 
corrosion resistance in metallur~ical uses or brilliant 
yellow hue in pigments. Within the metallurgical 
applications the possibility of substitution_ extends 
from virtually none for stainless steel production to a 
moderate potential, with some serious qualifications, 
for the other alloy steels. Chemical and refractory uses 
generally offer much better possibilities for substitution. 
Metallurgical Grade. The major metallurgical use of 
chromium in the production of stainless steel produces 
highly desirable corrosion and oxidation resistant 
qualities in the finished product. This can not be 
duplicated by substitution since "stainless steel can 
not be produced without chromium". 21 In emergencies 
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where adequate quantities of metallurgical grade chromite 
were not available to produce stainless steel, alternates 
such as cupronickel, ferritic steels and titanium alloys 
may be substituted for stainless steel with both cost and 
performance penalties. However, these potential substi-
tutes are subject to serious scarcities themselves and 
are currently produced in very limited quantities equal. 
to only about 5% of the output of stainless steel. 22 
Thus, they fail to provide a suitable alternate to the 
use of stainless steels in curren't application. With 
these conditions in mind, it is accurate to conclude that 
chromium has no practical substitutes in the production 
of stainless. steel and there are_ no practical alternates 
to the continued use of stainless steel in contemporary 
military and commercial applications. 
The second major end item use of chromium is in the 
production of various alloy steels, including tool steels. 
This application offers a much improved potential for 
substitution for two significant reasons. First, the 
majority of the uses for alloy steels, excluding stain-
less steel, are in general, non-strategic applications in 
the transportation, general construction, automotive, 
and general purpose industrial categories. In these areas 
chromium alloys derive their utility from properties of 
hardness, response to heat treatment, and resistence 
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to fatigue. These are significantly general physical 
properties which are found in several alternate alloys 
which do not contain chromium, for example nickel and 
molybdenum based steel alloys. These physical characteris-
tics also exist to some degree in other elements such as 
aluminum, manganese, and boron. Therefore, substitution 
based on the physical properties of the chromium alloys 
is technically possible within the limits of available 
supplies of these alternate materials. Improved techno-
logy offers the second reason for'· an improved substitution 
potential for chromium in alloy steels, excluding stain-
less steel. Recently, new very low alloy carbon steels 
fortified with small non-strateg~c additions of boron 
have been formulated which offer greater possibilities 
f 'b'' 'hf 23 or non-strategic su stitution int e uture. Thus, 
substitution in non-strategic alloys based on certain 
physical properties of the end item appears to be both 
technically feasible and possible in a situation of 
national emergency where a slight cost or performance 
penalty would assume a lower relative priority. 
Chemical· Grade. The possibility of substitution 
throughout most industries which use chemical grade 
chromite ore is good to excellent. The wide variety of 
chromium derived salts used in wood and water treatment, 
textile dyes, leather tanning operations, and medical 
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products can all be substit uted with existing materials 
with only minimal reductions in effectiveness or cost 
increases. For example, sodium silicate is approximately 
70% as effective as sodium bi chromate i n t he manufacture 
of water treatment compounds for use in water cooling 
towers for refriger ation and air cond.i tioning. ·The same 
general condition exists in the t extile and leather 
industries where aluminum hydroxide and vegetable tans 
will substitute with either higher costs or diminished 
effectiveness. Two uses of chemical grade chromium would 
present problems of some magnitude if they were to be 
discontinued. These are in electroplating of hard 
chromium coatings to achieve a high abrasion resistance 
and in the production of oil well drilling muds. There 
are currently no substitutes for hard chromium electro-
plating and therefore, a higher wear rate would be 
inevitable if a shortage of chromium was encountered. A 
similar situation exists in the production of oil well 
drilling muds where ferrochrome lignosulfate contributes 
to the density and sealing characteristics of the drilling 
mud. Its absence could not curtail oil well drilling 
operations, but would make them more time consuming and 
costly. 
Refractory Grade. The major proportion of refractory 
chromite is fo_nned into bricks and used for furnace 
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lining in the open hearth type of steel producing furnace. 
Use of the open hearth method of steel production is 
rapidly declining as newer electric furnaces gain wide-
spread acceptability. In addit i on , magnesite can be 
substituted for chr omi t e in certain of these ref ractory 
applications. For these reasons, substitution appears 
possible throughout most of t he refractory uses of 
chromium although both cost and performance would be 
adversely affected. 
Conclusion 
The preceeding review clearly indicates that total ' 
substitution for chromium is presently impossible. 
Therefore, the United States must of necessity retain an 
adequate , reliable supply of certain grades of chromite 
ore. As we have seen, this objective is normally satis-
fied by importation which is subject to curtailment or 
limitation for military, political or economic reasons. 
Thus, some alternate means is required to meet this 
objective. This has historically been accomplished 
through the development of domestic production capabilities 
and through stockpiling. This report will briefly review 
the achievements of these methods and then suggest an 
area where future United States• action may be desirable. 
Development of Domestic Sources. The United States 
has no reserves of high grade chromite ore which are 
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economically recoverable under current market conditions. 
The last domestic production of chromite occured from 
mines in Montana in 1961 under the Government Defense 
Production Act. This Act art ificiall y i nflated t he 
price paid domestic producers of chromite ores to over 
$110/ton as a means of encour aging domestic production 
and lessening foreign dependence. This price is far 
above the $45/ton paid for high.er quality South African 
chemical grade ores in 1975 and demonstrates the 
improbability of future domestic production. 
Stockpiling. Chromium has been designated a 
strategic material and is currently maintained in the 
national stockpile. The quantities, types and value of 
chromium in the stockpile as of JO November 1975 were 
as shown in Table 10. The established objective repre-
sents the shortfall between estimated available supply 
and estimated requirements for the first year of a 
conventional war fought simultaneously in Europe and 
Southeast Asia. The present inventories exceed objec-
tives to a significant degree because of a recent change 
from a three to a one year objective supply. 
The success of the present stockpile program is 
evident. However, questions of the utility of a stock-





STOCKPILE STATUS OF CHROMIUM AS OF 11i30/75 
(1,000 Short Tons ) 
AVAILABLE SALES TOTAL TOTAL FOR 
MATERIAL OBJECTIVE INVENTORY EXCESS DISPOSAL 11 MONTHS 
CHROMITE a 
Metallurgical Grade 445 1, 95) 1,508 0 
Chemical Grade 8 250 242 0 
Refractory Grade 54 400 346 0 
CHROMIUM FERROALLOYS 11 757 746 0 
CH ROM I UM MET AL 4 4 0 
NOTE, In addition to the data shown, the stockpile cont ains the following 
nonstockpile grade materials 551, 758 tons of metallurgical grade 
chromite and 2J,764 tons of chromium ferroalloys . 






weapons and of the cost of materials storage have fre-
quently been raised. These objections may result in 
further reductions in both objective quantities and on-
hand inventories which could severely l imit the utility 
of the stockpile in times of national emergency. Such a 
possibility reemphasized the necessity of dependable, 
adequate foreign sources of mineral resources in the 
future. 
Future Actions. The United States will remain 
dependent on foreign sources for an adequate, long-range 
supply of chromium. This dependence requires the United 
States to use all methods necessary to guarantee itself 
access to suitable supplies of either chromite ores or 
intermediate ferrochromes. The authors feel this objec-
tive can be met if the United States exploits certain 
inherent advantages which she has. One such advantage 
is an existing and projected dominance as a producer of 
agricultural commodities and foods which will afford 
increasing leverage as world population continues to 
increase. The exact method of using this potential 
leverage will vacy with the situation and is presently 







Cobalt is a hard silver-grey metal i n its pure state. 
It closely resembles both iron and nickel in hardness. 
strength and other properties. Cobalt is widely used 
in the aircraft and electronics industries in which a 
disruption in the supply would have a severe impact on 
capabilities. 
In reviewing the problems of assuring an adequate 
and uninterrupted source of cobalt this stud.y will first 
examine the commercial and military uses of cobalt and 
then examine the expected demand for this element in the 
years to come. The sources of cobalt will then be exam-
ined and the resulting geopolitical problems will be 
discussed. The study will next review and evaluate the 
actions taken to date to alleviate potential problems in 
the supply of cobalt. Some suggestions as to future dir-
rections of United States• policies and actions will 
conclude this portion of the study. 
Uses of Cobalt 
Until 1920 cobalt was primarily used in its salt 
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form as a bl ue coloring a.gent in the glass and ceramics 
industries . Since t hen, cobalt has been increasingl y 
used in i t s met allic state as an alloy . About 70% t o 
80% of the world pr oduct ion is now used in a lloys where 
a high r esistance t o heat or hi gh magnetic qual i t ies are 
needed. Although an important a lloy for s teel, a rel a-
tively small amount of t he metal is used when compared 
to other minerals. 
The total United States• consumpti on of cobalt i n 
1973 was only 18,741,000 pounds. 1 Table 11 depicts the 
use of cobalt within the United States duri ng 1972 and 
1973. The primary uses of metallic cobalt are for super-
alloys and magnetic alloys. Cobalt salts, particularly 
organic salts, are used as driers for paints, varnishes, 
and inks. Illustration 1 depicts the trends in the 
primary uses of cobalt for the past twenty years. As 
can be seen, the uses of magnetic and superal loys has 
dropped while other metalli c uses have risen. 
Su~eralloys represent about 20% of the demand for 
cobalt within the United States. Thes e alloys retain 
their strength and. other properties at extremely high 
temperatures . Superalloys containing f rom 5 to 65 percent 
cobalt are widely used in t he manufacturing of jet 
engines, gas turbines and other similar applications 
where resistenace to high temperature is essential, 
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TABLE 11 




Stainless & Heat Resisting 
Full Alloy 





Alloys (Other than Steel 
or Super), 
Cutting/Wear Resistant 





Mill Products from Powder 
Chemical and Ceramic, 
PigJnents 
Catalysts 
Ground Coat Frit 
Glass Decolorizer 
Other 


























Lacquers, paints, feed, etc, 2,691(e)19.0 
Miscellaneous 315 2,2 
TOTAL 14,lJO 100.0 






















197 1 .1 
J,569 19.0 
_ ..... 5 ..... 2___ 6 2.8 
18, 741 100. 0% 
W - Withheld to avoid. disclos ing company confidential data; 
totals included in Miscellaneous. 
SOURCE, U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Volume 1 
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Magnetic alloys account for about 25% of the United 
States • demand for cobalt. Cobalt is an essential 
element in the high quality permanent magnets used in 
electronic and communications equipment. 
Cobalt has a wide variety of uses which consume some-
what smaller percentages of the element. It is used as a 
binder to produce durable tungsten carbide machine tools 
and drill bits. Cobalt-60, a radioisotope form of the 
element, has both industrial and medical uses. In this 
radioactive form , cobalt has been used in the treatment 
of cancer. 
Cobalt is of significant importance to the maintenance 
of a modern military. Cobalt alloys are important compo-
nents of jet engines, rocket engines, and gas turbines. 
Magnetic alloys are likewise very important in defense 
production. They are used in various forms of electronics 
equipment, communications equipment and aircraft and 
missile guidance systems. 
Research by the . Stanford Research Institute indicates 
that in 1963 26% of the cobalt used in the United States 
was devoted to military purposes. The mill tary demand. 
has been decreasing in terms of the overall United States• 
demand, and in 1972, defense purpose amounted to only 12% 
of total demand. 2 The relationship of the defense sector's 
demand to total United States d.emand over the ten year 
6J 
period from 1963 through 1972 is shown in Table 12. The 
annual fluctuations in percent of defense use is largely 
attributable to fluctuations in the overall United States' 
consumption, rather than to changes in defense require-
ments.3 
Two general categories of use consumed over 80~ of 
the cobalt used within the defense sector in 1972. The 
manufacture of aircraft or spacecraft engine parts con-
sumed 62% of the cobalt used for defense purposes. 
Another 21% was used in various items of electrical 
equipment and supplies. The remaining 17% was used in 
several different items including airframe parts, paint 
4 and chemical prod~cts. 
Sources of Cobalt 
The domestic mining of cobalt ores was discontinued 
in 1971, Thus, all cobalt consumed in the United States, 
other than recycled scraps, must be imported, Recycled 
scrap provides only a small portion of ~he annual United 
States cobalt requirements. During the period 1969 
through 1973, purchased scrap never provided more than 
2.4% of the United States• needs. 
During 197J, the cobalt metal consumed in the United 
States was imported from fourteen nations. (Table lJ) 
Zaire has been the primary supplier having provided 61% 
64 
'rABLE 1 2 












Ten Year Mean in Defense Use - 19.4 
SOURCE, Stanford Research Institute, p . 208. 
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TABLE lJ 
U.S. IritPORTS OF COBALT METAL BY COUNTRY 
(Thousands of Pound) 
1221 1222 122) 
% Pounds % Pounds __!_ Pounds 
Austria 5 o.o 
Benelux 2499 24 . 1 3344 25 .6 4209 22.9 
Canada 909 8.8 633 4.8 502 2.7 
Dominican Rep. 23 0.1 
Finland 1208 11 . 6 1299 9.9 909 5.0 
r"'rance 126 1.2 500 J.8 197 1 . 1 
Germany, 'dest 2 o.o 12 0.1 J9 0.2 
I taly 45 0.2 
Japan 45 o.J 5 o.o 
Netherlands 42 0 .!J- 49 o.4 16 0.1 
Norway 800 7. 7 915 7.0 972 5.3 
Taiwan 55 O,J 
United Kingdom 223 2 .1 131 1.0 187 1.0 
Zaire 1i 572 44.o 5083 38.9 11196 61.0 
Zambia 1071 8.2 
TOTAL 10381 100. 0 13082 100.0 18360 100.0 
SOURCE, U. S. Bureau of Mines , Minerals Yearbook, Volume 1, 
1?73 , p. 406 
U.S. Bureau of Mines , Minerals Yearbook, Volume 1, 
1972, p . 422 
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of the cobalt met~ls needs in 19?3, Other important 
sources of cobalt-have been Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, 
Norway and Canada, However, only five of the nations 
supplying the United States with cobalt in 19?3 actually 
mined ores containing cobalt, The other nine nations 
had processing or recycling capabilities, but relied en 
other nations for their source of ores ·or scrap. 
A better overall picture of the primary sources _of 
cobalt can be obtained from examining the world mine 
output. The world production of cobalt by country from 
19?1 through 19?3 is displayed in Table 14, Zaire is the 
leading producer of cobalt ores in the world, and has 
produced well over one half of the world's supply for 
the past several years. Together with the neighboring 
country of Zambia, these two countries produce about two-
thirds _of the world's output of cobalt rich ores. Canada 
and. Cuba are the only two western hemisphere nations pro-
ducing cobalt ores. Together these two countries 
represent about 1.':?~ of the world's production. 
Future Demand 
The consumption of cobalt can be expected to expand 
in the' future, as the requirements .for high performance 
jet and gas turbine engines and complex-electronics 
components increase, After some years of decline, the 
TABLE 14 






Cuba (e) 1700 
Finland {e) 1400 
Morocco 1078 
Norway N/A 
USSR (e) 1750 
Zaire 1600) 
Zambia (e) 2330 
TOTAL 27299 
N/A - Not Available 

































SOURCE, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Volume 1, 
197J. p. 410 
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United States' demand fo r cobalt rose in 1972, and a 33% 
further increase in consumption in 1973 continued this 
upward trend. This increased consumption was a direct 
result of a rise in industrial activity within the United 
States.6 The 3tanford Research Institute Study, based on 
an analysis of the demand situations surrounding the use 
of cobalt, has projected a steady increase in the Unit ed 
States' demand for cobalt through the year 2000. Their 
model forecasts the United States' demand for cobalt as 
being 20,000,000 pounds in 1985 and 26,000,000 pounds 
by 2000. 
As the underdeveloped and lesser developed countries 
become more industrialized, the international demand for 
cobalt can also be expected to increase. However, the 
authors have found no projections of the prospective 
international demand for cobalt through the remainder 
of this century. 
Although future world demand is difficult to estimate, 
current reserves of cobalt appear ample for the foresee -
able future. Known world wide reserves of cobalt ores 
have been estimated as containing J,000,000 tons of 
cobalt.? Based on the current ratea of extraction 
(Table 14), th~se reserves would last over 100 years. 
Furthennore, about 200,000 tons of these known reserves 
are within the United States, although they are not 
currently being extracted. 8 Estimated world resources 
of cobalt are in excess of 4,000,000 tons of which over 
800,000 tons are believed to be located within the United 
States . 9 Additional resources might exist in manganese 
nodules recently discovered on the sea floor. These could 
lead to millions of additional tons of resources. 
New economical sources of cobalt have been discovered 
in recent years. Zaire in 1973 announced the discovery 
of two major new deposits containing an estimated 
685,000 tons of cobalt metal . Recent discoveries in the 
Philippines promises to produce about 650 tons of cobalt 
metal a year. 10 In short, unlike other resources, there 
seems t o be little likelihood that the world would "run 
out" of cobalt within the next hundred years. Known and 
likely sources appear ample for future needs. 
Geopolitical Concerns 
Although supplies of cobalt appear to be sufficient, 
access to· these sources of supply could be interrupted, 
and thereby· disrupt the flow of cobalt needed to sustain 
either or both the civilian and military requirements for 
the metal. Serious i nterruptions would. most likely result 
from being denied· the raw material by supplying nations, 
or the obstruction of transportation systems by a third 
power. Both aspects of the security of sources will be 
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reviewed as they pertain to cobalt. 
The atti-tudes of principle raw material suppliers 
to the United States must be examined closely to deter-
mine the security of these sources, The supplier nations 
today are sovereign nations. They are no longer the 
pawns of industrial powers, Many of these nations are 
developing. third world, countries that are nationalistic, 
idealistic and at times unpredictable, 
Our most serious problems in obtaining cobalt could 
result if relations with Zaire were to deteriorate. 
Zaire is easily our principal cobalt supplier having 
supplied directly 44%, 40%, and 61% of the United States• 
consumption in 1971, 1972, and 1973 respectively, In 
addition, Zaire provides the cobalt ore to nations that 
export metallic cobalt to the United States, .As a result, 
our dependence on cobalt from Zaire is even greater than 
that indicated by direct imports, The Stanford Research 
Institute estimates that in 1972, 47% of the United States' 
demand was actually satisfied by cobalt originating in 
Zaire, 11 A similar figure for 1973 might be from 65% to 
70% of the United States• demand based on the high per"". 
centage that was supplied by direct imports from Zaire, 
The Bureau of Mines estimates that BJ% of the United 
States' 1974 cobalt imports will originate in Zaire,12 
With the recent large deposits found in Zaire, that 
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country will continue to be the prime source of cabal t 
in the foreseeable future. 
Zaire follows a generally moderate line of foreign 
policy, but some evidence of a rise in nationalistic 
tendencies exists. In 1967, they nationalized the 
country's largest mining company and. later the "Return to 
Authenticity" program was established. The authenticity 
movement is an attempt at unification of the once dis-
organlzed tribal factions that were•prevalent in the 
colonial and early post-colonial days. The.program has 
.changed the name of the country to Zaire and given original . 
Zairian names to citizens and. governmental·organizations, 13 
Although occasionally hampered by economic ties with 
Western Europe and the United ·States, during the past ten 
years Zaire has made substantial economic gains. 14 
Two important current issues might affect the availa~ 
bility of cobalt and other minerals obtained from Zaire. 
The first of these is the current economic stabi.lity of 
Zaire. The largest contributor to that country's export 
earnings is the copper industry, Zaire produces about 
10% of the world mine output of copper, Because of the 
relative~y high copper prices in the early 1970's, the 
government greatly.expanded its economic development pro-
grams. However, with copper prices currently about half 
· their previous .levels, Zaire is having difficulty 
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r,-:nw.yi!1{:; loan;:, :,1.nc'I ir.: ,·u,r0::tten,:,d with bankruptcy. These 
financial proble,~s, if not promptly resolved, could re-
sult in domestic t1.lrm6.il and thereby disrupt the flow of 
D1any minerals, including cob a 1 t, from this resource rich 
country. The Uni tea States ha1; in the past and is likely 
to continue to provide Zaire vri.th some economic aid. 
~1\1.ile this aid is of significant help, a general rise in 
the price of copper is needed to return Zaire's economy 
t.o a strong position. 
A. second issue of consideraole concern to Zaire is 
the neighborinG -::ountry of M1e:ola. Zaire depends on the 
Bencuela tiailros.d for the shi.pment of ·copper and cobalt 
from its 3ha.ba (Katan1;a) region through Angola to the 
part of Labita on the Atlantic Ocean. There has been 
considerable fighting along this railway betv1een opposing 
factions in the An,'.;ols.n civil war. lriost railway managers 
and technicians have abandoned their jobs, and the rail-
viay has ceased _to opern.te. AB a result, Zaire has been 
shipping ·ores by slower and n1ore expensive routes, which 
can not handle tile quantity of shipments formerly carried 
on the Benguela flailway, Economic considerations have 
also played an important role in Zaire's active opposi-
tion to the Communist backecl Popular r,iovement for the 
Liberation of An,0;ola (1-,iPLA) r-egime in Angola. Zaire be-
J.ieves that an J,'lPLA rec;ime in Angola would allow the 
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3oviet Uni.on to· e.ffecti vely control Zaire• s shipments 
through ·the port at Lobi to, and that such economic con-
trols by the _Soviet Union would be unacceptable, Zaire 
also feels that tlf= Soviet Union is actively supporting 
rebel movements in Zaire's eastern regions, As a result, 
Zaire has been actively resisting the growth of Soviet 
influence on its political and. economic affairs, l5 The 
Angolan civil wa:r is currently affecting the flow of 
many minerals, includine cobalt, ·and a resolution of this 
war• in favor o:f the liiPLA might further restrict the avail-
ability of these minerals to industrial nations, Even if 
the Angolan question were resolved in favor of Zaire's 
interest, the financial problem might be aggravated, 
Both Zambia and Zaire have been stockpiling large·por-
tions of their copper production during the Angolan 
strife, and the release of these stockpiles would. likely 
restrict· copper prices from rising above their ·current· 
dep·ressed levels.,· 
The s.ecorid largest supplier of the United States• 
demand .is Belgium and Luxembourg, Together their.ship-
:ments have satisfied 24%, 26;,;, and 2J% of the United. 
States' demand during· 1971, 1972, and 1973 respectively, 
However, this source must itself import the basic raw 
materials, since neither nation possess cobalt ore_ deposits, 
Most of these ores come !'rom Zaire, Por this reason,·· 
many of the same limits that apply to the importation of 
Zaireian ore also apply to the import of metallic cobalt 
from Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Norway, Finland and Canada are our next most impor-
tant sources of supply, but their importance has been 
dwindling for the past several years and in 1973 they 
combined to supply only 1J% of the United States• demand 
directly. However, Canada does export a large percentage 
of her cobalt to Europe for further refining, and much of 
this metal is then exported to the United States. The 
Stanford Research Institute estimated that in 1972 
Canadian ores actually supplied 97~ of the United States • 
demana. 16 This is almost double the amount imported 
directly from Canada. 
The relatively small amounts of cobalt imported from 
sources other than Zaire, preclude these countries from 
individually disrupting the flow of cobalt imports to any 
significant degree . To significantly impact the price or 
quantity of United States• imports, these nations would 
have to join with Zaire in a cartel similar to the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
However, the economic importance of cobalt is relatively 
low in each exporting country, and significant political, 
cultural, and economic differences exist among the cobalt 
exporting countries. Thus, the formation of any effec.ti ve 
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cartel to control the price or production of cobalt is 
unlikely. Further, with the exception of Zaire, no 
nation or group of nations could significantly affect 
the United States import of cobalt by refusing to sell 
the mineral to United States• customers. 
The only manner in which the import of cobalt could 
effectively be disrupted by a nation, other t han Zaire, 
is by obstruction of the transportation system. One 
such disruption, that of the Benguela Railway in Angola, 
has been previously discussed. 
Both Zambia and Zaire are now exporting much of their 
mineral outputs on the Tanzams Railway between Zambia and 
the Tanzania port of Dar es-Salaam, and by railway through 
Rhodesia. However, because of difficulties between 
Zambia and Rhodesia, the Rhodesian route, although used 
to some extent, has been officially closed. These long 
rail routes terminate at overcrowded ports and are sus-
ceptable to being closed for political reasons. 
The sea lines of communication present potentially 
the greatest opportunity for disrupting the now of 
cobalt between Zaire and western industrial nations. 
During past wars, sea routes in general have been partic-
ularly vulnerable to enemy action, and this would likeiy 
be the case in future conventional conflicts. All 
imports to the United States, except tor those from 
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Canada, would be susceptable to interdiction of sea 
routes. As indicated in Table 1J, 96.8% of the United 
States 1973 imports of cobalt and 94.9% of 1972 imports, 
were transported across the Atlantic Ocean, Thus, the 
Atlantic sea routes during periods of armed conflict 
would present a particularly vulnerable area for dis-
rupting needed mineral shipments and thereby signifi-
cantly impact the United States• industrial base· if th~ 
conflict ·were broad and protracted, 
Substitution 
Cobalt is closely related to nickel and some substitu-
tion of cobalt-saving combinations in magnetic alloys or-
cemented carbide tools may be possible. However, cobalt 
has electromagnetic properties which are superior to 
nickel, and its heat and wear resistance properties make 
cobalt superalloys and tooling particularly desirable. 
These three areas include the largest and most strategic 
uses of cobalt metal, and substitution of significant 
'. quant~ties of cobalt in these alloys would be difficult, 
The economics of the particular application would be the 
driving factor to any substitutions. Since adequate 
supplies of cobalt are available at reasonable prices 
little effort has been directed to the development of 
various substitutions which might directly or indirectly 
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save cobalt. Changes in the price and availability of 
cobalt would be required before an active effort to 
develop substitutions for cobalt metal were initiated. 
Stockpiling 
Cobalt has been designated as a strategic material. 
As such, stockpiles of the metal are maintained by the 
Federal Preparedness Agency in order to decrease and pre-
vent the dangerous and costly dependence of the United 
States upon foreign sources of cobalt during periods of 
national emergency. 
As of JO June 1975, the national stockpile of cobalt 
contained 48,920,040 pounds valued at $195,700,000. The 
Federal Preparedness Agency has established an objective 
to maintain 11,945,000 pounds of cobalt in the national 
stockpile.17 The objective is based on high priority 
requirements for cobalt metal during the first year of a 
major conventional war. Adjustments in the objective 
have been aade to allow for the substitution of other 
metals tor cobalt during the period of emergency. 
The Federal Preparedness Agency is reducing its inven-
tory levels of cobalt to meet its objective inventory 
level. Between July 1974 and June 1975, about 6,000,000 
pounds of cobalt were sold for industrial use. 18 Current 
legislation allows for the disposal of cobalt inventories 
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to a level of 38,200,000 pounds, Additional disposal 
legislation would. be required if the Federal Preparedness 
Agency's stockpile objectives are to be met, 
· Development of Domestic Sources 
No domestic cobalt ores of high quality have been 
. 
found and there has been no domestically mined cobalt 
since the end of 1971, Efforts have been mad.e to develop 
mines in Idaho since that time, but no output has been. 
produced, 19 When domestic sources were producing, the 
cobalt was a by product of the mining of zinc or iron, 
However, even as a by product, domestic cobalt production 
can not compete ~ith-the price of cobalt from foreign 
so~rces.. Increases in the price of cobalt, or severe 
reductions in its availability on international markets 
. . 
would be required before domestic cobalt production could 
' be profitably resumed, The specific requirements for 
this occurrence were detailed in the previous chapter 
on chromium and do not require repeating, 
Conclusions 
In ranking 74, strategic materials as to their poten-
tial for adversely influencing the national security, . 
the Stanford Research ·Institute rated cobalt as the 
· 20 · eleventh most severe problem. Three factors contributed 
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significantly to this high ranking1 the high percentage of 
the United States' demand used within the defense indus-
tries, the high percentage of imports, and the difficulty 
in substituting other materials for cobalt. While this 
may be a high ranking, the problem is not as severe as 
this study implies. 
From our review it is apparent that on a world wide 
basis there is no shortage of cobalt . AD,.ple reserves 
exist, and many of these reserves, although of lower 
quality ores, exist within the United States and Canada. 
These sources could be developed in case of a national 
emergency. 
The national stockpile objectives seem sufficient to 
assure the continued support of defense requirements and 
other high priority uses during the time it would take to 
develop domestic sources of cobalt. During this period 
of emergency, lower priority uses of cobalt would have to 
use substitutes, be curtailed or be supported only to the 
extent that imports could be continued. 
Although planning and controls on the consumption of 
cobalt would be required in the event of a conventional 
war, priority needs for cobalt metal could be met. 
Current planning in this area appears to be adequate to 
meet the United States' security requirements during a 
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pro,tracted conflict based on current and proJect~d trends. 
in cobalt.consumption • 
. A problem might' res1,1lt. if' for reasons. other than 
armed:c9nflict, sourc~s of co'l)a.lt were denied the United 
. : . ' . " 
·: States• ·economy. ,The oniy likely manner in which thi's · 
' . ''. . ' . . ' ' 
' ',YfOUld•,OCCU~ is because of diplomatic difficulties with ' 
Zaire.'. Under these circumstances. the Federal Prepared-
.. · . ness Agency would be reluctant to lower the strategic 
.. '. ' . - , . . 
·.: , . stockpile. level below.· the current objective.,·. Thus •. 
'' 
, domestic shortages of cobalt. would result that coul.d . 
impact. the United States• economy as a whole. This 
impact would not b~ nearly as severe as that , experienced,, 
during the· oil embargo in 197J, To preclude 'this type of 
p~oblem, our relations with Zaire must ,remain stable, an~,.,. 
· should encourage 'increased economic activity between 
u~'ted S~tes~ lndu~try and Zaire. ·Although cob~l~· is 
' . ' 
but 'one. relatively small issue in the ultiniate det~mina-
' • I • . ' •.~ .. 
' tion of Unlted States! relations with Zaire •. it typifies'. 
: tb:e ne.e'd for strong relations with this. resource rich: , , 
· nation. Continued economic· aid to Zaire. would help to · 
, ' ... . 
, stre~gthen her e,conomy which i!=' currently j,n EL very 
wttake~ed pos.ition. Here again; conti~uati.ori of our 
·current fo~ign .and economic policies towards Zaire 
would appear in order: 
• • > I . • 
;:; 
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As stated at the beginning of this paper, a moderri 
industrialized nation needs dependable sources of its 
stra1:egic minerals. Cobalt is no exception. However, a 
long term disruption in the flow of cobalt from foreign 
sources, whether because of political, economic, or 
· inili tary, action, would have little impact on the United 
States• economy or its national security. 
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CHAPTER V 
PLATINUM GROUP METALS 
Introduction 
The platinum group of metals includes platinum, pal-
, ladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium and rutherium. These 
elements are located throughout the world, but usually 
in small amounts that preclude their economic extracti.on, 
The platinum group in their metallic state are silver~ 
white and ductile, 
Platinum and palladium are used by United States 
indus.try to a much larger extent than the other four 
metals "in the grouping, In fact, platinum and palladium. 
have consistently amounted to about-95% of the consumption 
,of platinum· group metals by weight, This relationship _is 
shown in Figure 15, These two elements can be analyzed 
and fu~ther segregated so as to determine the fraction 
of the total United States• demand for each that is 
derived .from the defense sector of the economy. Thus,· 
· , this report will be primarily concerned with these two 
members of the platinum group and their potential problems. 
In reviewing the problems of assuring adequate and 
uninterrupted sources of platinum group-metals this study 
8J 
TABLE 15 
PLATINUM-GROUP METAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 
1954 - 1972 
(100 Troy Ounces) 
OTHER 
PLATINUM J_ PALLADIUM _L METALS TOTAL 
1972 543 J4,8 87~ 56,2 141 1560 
1971 431 J4,0 760 · 60,0 75 1266 
1970 lf75 J6,6 739 57,0 BJ 1297 
1969 532 38,7 759 55,3 82 1373 
. 1968 496 ·38,6 721 56,2 67 1284 
1967 634 4_7,5 621 46,5 79 1JJ4 
1966 691 41,2 894 53,3 91 1676 
1965 411 34,6 717 60,4 59 1187 
1964 451 40.3 591 52,9 76 1118 
1963 424 . 42 ,3 527 52,5 52 1003 
1962 ·. 304 35,1 520 60.0 . 42 866 
1961 283 J4,4 508 61. 7 32 . 823 ·• 
1960 · J24 1,1; 8 414 53,4 37 775 · 
1959 363 I.J,0,5 488 54.,5 45 _896. 
. 1958· 261} 38.) 395 57,2 31 690 
19.57 J48 46~6 367 49.,2 31 746 . 
1956 h3l . 50~2 400 46 6 .• 28 859 
1955 467 54,9 352 41,4 32 851 
1954. J20 55.0 235 4o·,4 . 27 582 
SOURCE, U,S, Bureau of.Mines, Minerals Yearbook, Volume 1, 
Various Issues 
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will first examine the commercial and military uses of 
. -
these metals and then examine their expected demand 
·until the year 2000, The study will also review the 
sources of these metals and discuss significant geopo-
litical concerns which could affect the availability.of 
these metals. Some of the actions taken by the United 
.States Government to alleviate. the potential problems 
in the supp·ly of platinum and palladium will be reviewed-
and evaluated. This portion of the study will conclude 
with suggestions as to possible future direction~ of 
United States' actions and policies concerning these 
metals, 
Uses of Platinum Group 
These me.tals ·are relatively inert, resist corrosion, 
and serve as excellent catalysts. in many. chemical pro--. . 
cesses,· As such, the chemical industry is an extremely· 
large user of platinum group metals. The electrical ·and 
petroleum industries are also very large users of plati-
num and palladium, 
Within the· chemical industry the platinum metals are-
used for several purpo_ses. For example, platinun1 is a 
necessary· catalyst in the manufacturing of nitric acid 
and fertilizers, .Again acting as a catalyst, platinum, 
when combined with aluminum oxide, increases the octane 
rating of gasoline, Also, because_of the general inert 
qualities of platinum, it is also an essential component 
of chemical laboratory and plant equipment, Palladium 
·readily absorbs hydrogen ·and when heated it readily re-
leases this hydrogen. Thus it is an important component 
in the refining of• hydrogen, 
! 
The largest single user of palladium is the electrical 
industry, Palladium alloy contacts are:used in equipment 
when low levels of electrical current are prevalent. Tele-
communications equipment uses many palladium contacts, 
When combined with silver or gold, palladium is used in 
various thermocouples, Likewise, some platinum is.used 
for electrical contacts and high temperature thermocouples 
or thermometers. When platinum is combined in a cobalt. 
alloy excellerit permanent maenets result. Palladium 
currently is· displacing the more expensive gold and 
platinum in many of their electrical uses. 
Within the are·a of, medicine, both platinum and palla"'.' 
· dium are widely used •. Platinum alloys are extensively 
· · used in the manufacture of surgical tools and pall_adium 
is used in .. dental alloys to improve strength, 
The platinum. group metals are not used in. iarge 
quantities by industry, but they have a disproportionately 
. large effiict on the economy as a whole, The direct 
effects of platinum.metals on the United States' economy 
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' 
might best be exemplified by the impact of platinum, and 
·palladium a11·oys · in the electrical and _electronic indus-
. tril!s·.. However.- .this group of metals has an even more 
significant indire_ct impact on .United States economic 
.activity. The various.acids and chemicals. produced by. 
'.processes utilizing platinum metals as catalysts are 
essential in the manufacturing of many other chemicals 
.- and goods which are fundamental to .the ·maintenance of .a· 
stable economy. • 
The United States• annual consumption of the platiqum .· 
·:'.~oup'metals has. been between. 1,3.50,000 and 1,800,000. 
;. 
. · troy ounces from the late 196o•s. through 1973. .In 1974 · 
, c:9nsuinption jumped to 1,981,000 troy ounces and then as 
. -·...;the economy slowed, 197.5 consumption dropped to an· 
.. :estimated 1,J00,000 t~oy ounces. 1 Recent palladium con-
su~pticin has been mor~ . than 800; 000 troy ourice1:1 annually. . . . ' ' . . 
while the annual consumption of platinl.llli has been about··: 
.5.50,000 troy ounces. .Tables 16 and 17 depict t_be indus·- ... · 
trial u~es·of platinum and palladium within the United 
-~tates during the years of _1971 and 1972, 
. . 
,• The metals within .. the platinum group are increasingly.· -
:., • ; I •'• '• . • 
important. to the' mairitenance of a modern niiti tary estab-. 
. . .. . ._ ... •, 
lishment. - Important ~il.itary.uses of plati~um ll)~tals 
: alloys include magnets.· for ~~ve tubes~- telecommunication~' 
' . . . . . 
contact·s, and electrical instrumentation ·curcui ts. The . 
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Tro;y Ounces ~ Tro;y Ounces 
135 31 ,2 226 
142 32,9 96 
41 9,5 27 
52 12,0 92 
2J 5,J JO 
19 4.4 21 
~ 4.6 _5Q 
4)2 100,0 542 
SOURCE, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 
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. · .. ,·SOURCEi _u,s .. Bureau of Mines, •Minerals Yearbook,·_. 
. . . Volume 1, 19?1 . · · .. · .• 
. •, .· ,·. -: -,. u.s. Bureau-of Mines, finerala·Yearbook,· 
, .. ·, ·. ,. .Volume 1, ·1972, P• 10 . · .. 
• c,•: > 
.'"'. :' '.,: .- .. : -- . 
-, ni tfic acid produced by using platinum as a catalyst_, is ' 
an,_ essential ingredient in the· manufacture of explosives, . . . - . . . - . ·. . . ' --
· -_ · · The Stan.ford Research Institute study, quoted in pre-
• • • . • . i • • 
-,-vious .chapters·, i_ndicates that during the period stu~ied . . . -· ' .. .·, 
-_ :,: (i968 to :~972), :t>etwe~ri ~ive ·and sev:en percent of the ' : . 
-. ; _United States• co?)sumptibri ·of. ;la tin~ was e·xperided with- . . , ._., . . 
· .in the • defense ·sector_ of, the · economy. Likewise, between 
· - :. 'five and- eight .percent of'. the total Uhi ted St~tes' < . . .. · : . ' - .- ' . -_ .. - . . _,, .; . 2 -
palla.diuni consumption_ was devoted to military purposes •. . . . . ' 
• • • -. -·•.. • ', . -• • • _ • I 
'; _ :- The recent t~ends. in consumption 9f both metals fe>r !D~li:-
.• ·' tary ,p~rp~ses has be.en decreasing iri, .t~ms, of. quanti tle~ - . . . -_ 
·:: '; .. :·_ . . ·• ' ·, ' . . . - '. . . ,. ., ... . . . . . . .. . " ' ... 
_ -',:- used. -~d as a· percentage_ of/ ~he overall. ,Urii ted States•· 
-_ .. ~onsumpttori, · · Re~ent con1:111~ptic,n. of -these metal$ for 
'def~~~e .purpc>ses. hf -~ho~ i~ T~ble 18. -;.. , . . 
• • ,• ', • •• • • • a 0 
... · .·• F~ur general' categories of,use accounted for' about 
' .. . ' •. - . ,- . . . . . . . . '\ . '. 
·.· ;~ .• ~f'.cthe platinum ·u~ed. ~ithi~ '.th~ dE1fe~se.·~ecti>rin ··:· .: __ 
., . .- . '. '. --, : . . .. . . . ' ~'. . . '_· .. , . . . . . . ,\ : .· . .· ·,, '. :·;. . 
. ·_1972_. '· T.elecoffl!'lunications cont~ols consumed .about· Jl" of\- .·., 
. • ,;. !· . . . ' i • 
· .. the piatinum 1.1sed, fc,r', defense puriose~~. ~otJter 259' was 
. . . . . " . . . . · .. ~ 
·.·used in ,the ~efiniJ'.lg pf w.ri~us :petrol~um product13. -" ' ' 
( .,_ . . . ' ' . . 
. Inorga.Jiic industrial i:heinicals · r~prese~tea' ~bout f "N' of'i 
, the. ~~tense d~and, -- and : or~'ic ',-indust;i,1:11 '~heml~a{s . ' 
·, ' • • " ' " ,, • "i ·•· • •, l, • 
. ·. amounte,d to ,~Qthei:.'11%~ •The: remaini~g:16% of the:·•defense· 
' demand "r~~ plati~k W~S .used
0 
,in a wide va~iety of ·i~~~s.J •. 
' • . • • ,' -',. ,· ' • r : . _' ; ' - • ' ·• ~ 
·:· _ Telec9mmunic~tiohs ·controls used 56" of the palladium 
' ,, , . . 
. · : devoted. to mtilt~ry p~rposes. ;· Organic , industrial · .' ,, 
' ,: ;, ' ·, . . . , . 
1,968 
' 




• TABLE 18 
· PLATINtJ)l PALLADIUM 
. , . ,C ot ;c ot . : 
.. Tr9X Ounces . u~s. Demand ·. i'roy Ounces U.S. Demand. 
· . · J4·,7J.0. 





















'. '. SOU!lCE i Stanford 'Research · Ins~i tute. Study, ::p. 209· · _ 
' .. 
chemicals represented another 21% of the military demand 
for palladium, Inorganic chemicals amounted to 5% of 
i 
the defense demand, The remaining 18% of the defense de-
mand for palladium wa~ used in various items, including 
about 2% for petroleum products, 4 
Sources of Platinum Group 
One company mines a.small amount of platinum group 
metals in Alaska, and virtually all of the remaining 
United States' primary production is as a by-product 
from the refining of copper. The refining of secondary 
metal, or scrap reprocessing, produces a considerably 
larger, but still·relatively small, percentage of the 
total United States' demand. Table 19 relates the do-
mestic production, both primary and secondary, of all 
platinum_ group metals to the tot'al United States• con-
·sumption for the years 1971 through 1975 . 
. Exports of refined platinum group metals have con-
sistently been over·:twice the domestic production of 
these metals, since s,ome imported metals are reexported 
after processing, Thus imports of these minerals have 
essentially accounted.for 100% of the total United States' 
requirements, A detailed analysis of the imports for 
consumption of platinum group metals for 1971 and 1972 
is presented in Tables 20 and 21, As can be seen, the 
9_2 
TABLE 19 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS . 
. (In 1,000 Troy Ounces) 
Total· 
'· 1U .S .• , Primary Secondary 
Consumu, Production Production 
1971 1261 21. 278 
1972 · 1562 ,15 256 
1973 .18J1 20 266 . 
1974 1981 lJ 325 
1975 (est) lJOO i6 JOO 
. . . . 
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_-_··• PAT.I,ADIUM ,' 
Troy % 
< Ounces Pd 
1.6 0.2 
J,2 0,5. · __ 
o.4-· 0,1 
·· o.6 0.1 
:39.1 
_- ,,' J,'2, : . ,0,5---•\ o. 9· o .• 1 
-, )tb(a) {.;. - 0.5 , o,1 
'''oTHER -
·Troy , ,t-
Ounces -. · Other 
O,O(a) - .,. 
J,2 -· 6;j 




USl?R. 69,2· :,Ji.-6 J.32,9 50,6 
- United- !Cingdom ·268,5 ·'45;2 ·: 2S4.7 38 17 






(Table 20 - cont'd) 
Total Platinum Group Imports - 1,J02,800 Troy Ounces 
Percent of Group Imports, 
fl 
Platinum - 45.6% Palladium - 50.5~ Other - J.~ 
(a) - Less than 50 Troy Ounces 




U.S. IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION 
PLATINUM GROUP METALS 
1972 
(1,000 Troy Ounces) 
PLATIJiUM PALL,M!IUM OTHER 
Troy % Troy % Troy % 
Ounces Pt. Oynces Pd Ounces Other 
Australia 7.4 1.1 1.0 0.1 
Benelux 15.9 2 • .3 
Botswana O.J 
Brazil 1.0 0,1 0.1 
Canada 15.3 2.2 13.5 1.5 10.8 4.5 
Columbia 19.5 2.8 6.o 2.5 
Costa Rica 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Finland 0.7 0.1 · 
Germany, West 12.2 1.8 6.8 o.a 0.7 0 • .3 
Ghana 0.1 . .._ 
Japan J7,.3 5.4 J4.J J.8 40.2 16.6 
Malawi 0.5 0.1 
Mexico lJ.8 2.0 1.9 o.a 
Netherlands o.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 • .3 0.1 
Neth. Antilles o.o(a) 
' • - ... 
New Zealand o.o{a) 
Norway 8.2 1.2 15 .1 1.7 
Panama 0.5 0 : 1 o.o(a) 
South Africa 116.0 16.8 111.9 12.4 9.8 4.0 
Sweden 2.8 o.4 
Switzerland 2.1 0.2 
Turkey 1.6 '0.2 
USSR 169.t~ 24.5 523.1 58.0 4J.8 18.1 
United Kingdom 267.2 J8.6 193.8 21.5 128.7 53.1 
Venezuela 0 1 o(a) - ... 




(Table 21 - cont'd) 
Total Platinum Group Imports - 1 ,8J6,J49 Troy Ounces 
Percent of Group Importss 
Platinum - 37.7% Palladium - 49.1% Other - lJ,2% 
(a) - Less than 50 Troy Ounces 




·three countries which provide the vast majority of these 
.metals'are.the United Kingdom, the Soyiet Union, and the . . . . ' 
Ri;!pub.l:ic of South Africa, -
" 
However, .'.as is often the case, the sources of mineral 
imports are n<>t always the prim!!-ry sources of the raw · . 
materials. themselves, . In the case of these platinum group 
~eta.is;. the. United Kingdom merely has the refining capa-. ; . ' .. ' ' . . •. . -· 
bility .and does rio:t .mine the or~s. The .Republic of South 
Afrlca j:,rovide!3 1:1:e United KJngdom, with a~ost all_ o'f .its' 
ores, .• •. Thus ·S~uth. Africa is the most biportant 'sour~e ·or 
. platinum group metals ··consumecl · in the United. States·; ·· The ~; . ' 
w.orld mine outputs of·p1atinum group metals are ~ontaihea 
i~ Table 22, The .Soviet Union ·anq South Africa produce 
: : between 80 to 90 percent o:t: the world's: platinum group 
, ores,· .·Canada is. the ·1:hird ·largest producer, but _it supplies 
-. .. . ' . 
Future D~ancL 
. . : ~- . . ._ ' • • '. . t ,-' ; ., ,: .. 
. The' .requirement: for platinum group metals within the· .. · 
' ,,, .. . . ·,, . . . . . ' . 
'urii ~~d States·' i~ ;rojec~ed to expand i~ the; ne~t sev~~a-i , 
. ·ye•rs·.": The 'Bureau. of Mines. expects this increase·. to· lie·.:, · 
', abo11t: J% through,, 1980 ~:s . In their' stu~y of the "~equ~~~;~t~ 
. . , . 
for pla.tinum · group met_als during .the remainder of' this . 
. . . . . . ' ~ . . . 
century, ,the Stanford '.Research Institute also proje~ted, . . ,• ,-
a steady_· rise. in 'demand. Their moc:lel· fore(?aSted ~. d~~~d . 
.' '., ;-,, 
~ ' ' -;~ ,· . . . . . ~, .,. . 
TABLE 22 
\110.RLD MINE OUTPUT OF 
ALL PLATINUM GROUP METALS 
(1,000 Troy Ounces ) 
1220 
% of Troy 
1221 
Troy % of 
1222 ;c of Troy 
Ounces Output Ounces Output Ounces Output 
Canada 482.4 11.4 475.2 11.6 399.0 8.6 
Columbia 26.4 o. 6 25.6 o.6 26.0 o.6 
Ethiopia 0.3 o.o 0.2 o.o 0. 2 o.o 
Finland ( e) o.6 o.o o. 6 o.o o.6 o.o 
Japan ?.9 0.2 8.8 0.2 9.9 0.2 
Philippines 1.2 o.o 1.5 o.o 7.5 0.2 
South 
Africa (e) 1502.8 35.5 1254.2 30.7 1803.0 39.1 
USSR (e) 2200.0 51. 9 2300.0 56.J 2350.0 50.9 
U. S. 12,J 014 I 18.0 o.4 12.1 o.4 
TOTALS l+2J8.9 100.0 4084.1 100.0 461J.J 100.0 
SOURCE• u.s. Bureau or Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Volume 1, 
1972, p. 1053 
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for palladium of about 1,000,000 troy ounces by 1985 and 
. a, demand for platinum of' about. 850,000 troy ounces.by· 
. the ~arne. year,- 6 For. the entire group d.emand was pro- . 
jected at·2,ooo,ooo troy ounces by 1985 
:. ··._.: . ··: .· _· .i.1,:1_: -_ 
: 2,600,000 troy o_unces·,by the. end of the 
and growing to . . . . 
cen~u~. 7 · 
. As the world :consumption of automobiles and .e:!,ectron-
- . - ·. -· .· - . . . . . 
ics ,' particularly: communic~1;ions, expand1:1 dtirit1g: the next . 
. ' ,. ' . . .... . . ' , ' 
s.e~eral 'years,. tl'le'· wc;>rld~wi4e demand for platinum metals .• 
'-. . . ' ·. . . . ,;•; -.. . 
.can be expected to increase_, · The.✓increasing concern, f_or· 
air. pollution . resul tirig from automobile emissions· will. 
likewise increase. demand,. ,·iul these -metals are important 
in reducing the amount of air pollutants ·released,. How-
. . .'. . - . 
. . ·ever, . in compiling, this study. 'the authors were unable' 
. . . . . . . . ' . . -.~ .. --. . :. . ;· .. . . . . .• . . 
to. find projection!! of the -world-wide ·demand for platinum. 
. . . . . 
group. metals for thE! remainder of _this _:century. 
·. ·.: Th~ known w~rid-•~ide ~eso~'i=ces of plati~u~ group 
me.ta.ls· is · ab~ut 1,800,000,000 ·troy. ounces, Of ·this, 
abo~~ 600 ,ooo ,'006 ar~.' :~o~~idered · to be :re~erv~s. - ·The · 
• ; ',, ,. • ... , • • ·• ." ' • ': • \_• ,, ] • • 1 r •:, • " • • •,,;' < • ' •, ,:; ' 
13).lrea.u = of Mines 'estimates tbe;t, 'j;hese wo.rld reserves: will· 
. . . . . . . . - . . . . . 
. las't for w·ell over 125 years based on t.heir -projected 
... ·. ·. . . . ' . . ,:, . . . . . . 8 . . . . . 
primary demand for the P,er;od of 1975-2000, _ -:If a.ll 
~ . 
· . ·· currently. ·known resources were exploitable well oyer 
; JSO 'years ot demand would be satisfied, .. , 
The.-~ituation surr~~ndilig domestic ~sources is some-, 
' ~ ' ' 




amount to about 210,000,000 troy ounces of which only · 
about 7,000,000 can be considered reser.ves and currently 
exploitable. 9 Current domestic reserves of platinum grou_p 
metals'represent.oniy J to 4 times the current annual re-
quirements for primary ores. Total domestic resources 
are relatively plent'iful, ·but because of the low grade 
of the ores they are largely undeveloped, Significant 
increases in the relative prices of platinum ores would 
be required before these resources would be developed, 
The domestic demand for platinu~ group metals will, of . 
. necessity, probably always be satisfied largely by imports. 
Geopolitical Concerns 
Although world-wide reserves of platinum group metals 
appear to be more than ample in meeting a growing inter-
. . 
national demand, the United States wili have to rely 
heavily on foreign sources to meet its domestic require-
•ments, · Access to the varied sources of supply·could'be · . ' . . 
1:nterrtlpted . a_nd thereby disrupt the orderly flow of ~hese 
vital minerais. Two of the primary means by which this. 
flow could be interrupted isby the United States being 
denied access to the raw materials by the supplying 
nation itself or by the obstruction of the transportation 
network by a third power, Both of these aspects concern-
ing the . s_ecuri ty of sources will be reviewed as they · 
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per.tain to the platinum group metals, 
Both the attiturles and stability of principle raw 
ma.terial suppliers must be closely examined to determine· 
the ··security of these sources. The nations supplying the 
United States with platinum group metals are primarily the 
United Kingdom, South·Africa, and the Soviet Union, As 
·was previously noted, the United Kingdom obtains- its raw 
· materials subs.tantia.lly from Sou.th Africa, Consequently, 
difficulties.in United States• relations with either South 
Africa or the Soviet Union could have a significant impact 
·on the ava_ilabili ty of platinum group metals in the re-
quired quantities; 
Although Soutb Africa directly supplied only 12, ?~~ o.f 
tl1e United States' demand for: platinum group metals in 
1971 and 12,9;,~ in 1972, over 50% of the-total United 
States• ·demand in 1971 and 4-5f, in 1972 were satisfied by 
ores originating from ·south Africa, This r_elationship is 
·evident. from· '.!'ables 20 and 21 when South. African and 
United Kingdom .imports are combined. 'i'hus, South Africa .. 
is t1learly our most important source of -platinum group 
mi.n(irals, particularly of platinum itself.· Additionally, 
the Bureau of r,!ines estimate!3 that about 70% ·of the· 
world's .reserves 'of platinur.i are located in South Africa, 1° 
Thus, that country will continue to be a prime source of 
plati.num group- metals into the foreseeable future, 
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While South l1frica is the most hie)1ly industrialized 
nation in Africa and has in the past been a highly relia-
ble supplier of many minerals to the United States and 
other industrialized nations, its future as such is be-
coming increasingly one of concern, This concern was 
· __ brought· out in detail in the chapter on chromium. The 
problems of obtaining.a reliable supply of platinum group 
metals is merely a portion of this overall and mu.ch 
lare;er problem. 
The_second largest supplier of the United States' re-
quirements for platinum group metals is the Soviet Union;: 
As indicaTed in Tables 20 and 21, the Soviet Union supplied 
aboµ-t. 31% of our total 1971 demand· for platinum group. 
me_t,als and about 40% in 1972, However, the Soviet Union 
is the, primary· source of .palladium, having supplied 51% 
--- o.f tt;e total 1971 demand and 58% of the 1972. The Bureau 
_ of l,iines estimates that about_ 150,000 troy ounces, or 25% 
. ·of .the ·currently Jcno1m worlc;l' s reserves, are located in . . 
:- the ;3oviet Union; 11 Thus the Soviet Union_ should, iik.e 
South Africa, maintain its position as an important-source 
of platinum group metals, particularly _pallad1um, 
The Soviet Union continues to present signific::i.nt · _· · 
economic, poiitical, and ideological proble~s_for.t.he 
' . . ,· . . 
Uni tP.d States, The- ·potential effects of these concerns on 
mineral irnport1; were de-tailed in a previous chapter. 
lOJ 
. However, the reLiahil.ity of the Sovie.t Union as a long 
term sti.p7)lier of platinum r;rotip metals ·remains problem-· 
a tic; 
Canada; Columbia, ,Japan, and the Benelux nations are 
the next most im1Jortant suppliers of platinum group metals, 
Individually, or even collectively, they provide only a 
-' small portion of' tho total United States' imports for 
· consumptiun. · In 1971 thP.se nations supplied less than 
· '10:/, of. the United States' import requirements and in 1972 
their contribution was only 10,5%, 
The rela'ti vely small amounts of ·platinum .group metals. 
imported·i'rom sources 'other than South Africa or Russia, 
· .1;rec1u·ae these nations. from individually disrupting the 
flow or' pla.tinnm min(,rals to any significant degree. To 
imJiact :the price .or quantity of United States' imports., 
the::rn na.t.ions would have to ,join with either South Africa 
.or the .;Joviet Uni.on in·. a cartel type of action•: Such an· 
organization i.s high'ly unliltely because of .the ·polit.icf3:l, 
,· . 
and idee>logi9al differences between the smaller suppliers 
and th.e Sov.le·~ Union, ·and the general expression of ,inter-. · 
nat'tonal diifapproval af extensive relations with South 
A frir!a;· 
One scenario, whl le not currently likely, doe~· seem_,., 
· posEd.ble whereby an.effective political cartel · of many of 
the v:orld' a minerals, including the platinum group .metals·; 
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could be estab'iished. This situation would require the 
overthrow of the c~rrent South African. government, as a· 
possible result of it~ interracial policies, and-the .. 
establishment of· a government sympathetic to the Soviet· 
Union, Under such conditions, a highly effective producer 
group.could be easily estab.J.ished that could control the 
flow a_nd prices .of several :internationally important · 
··minerals. 
In addition.to teing denied access by the supplying 
nations, the sou1~ces of thci _platinum metals. might be 
interrupted through., the interdiction of transportation 
routes by third nations. Both the Soviet Union and South 
-.1\frica have several ports with relatively good transporta-. 
tion systems between their mi.neral deposits and the ports; 
'rhus thE:! sea line_s of' communication present potentialiy 
the greatest opportunity for disrupting th~-flow of 
r,latinum t:roup metals between the supplying'natiohs and-•··· 
the we.stern industrialized na.tiohs, 
,'. 
-During past wars:, 
ti1.erie sea routes !}ave _been vulnerable to enemy action_ and 
this i'ioulcl° likel,'{, he thr:? case in future con~entional con:- · 
flicts, of a. protracted na tur.e, All significant importsiof . 
. \1latinum grou1) metals y.,i th the exception of those from·.· 
Canada,. and p0Gs1bly those from Colombia,. woufd be ·suscep-
table to interdiction of sea routes, A glance back to 
' - ,· ' 
TablP.s 20 and ?.l will show that substantially all of'. the· 
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, United States.'. imports require some ·ocean transpozitat~orl',; 
and· most require the transit of the Atlantic Ocean. '.T,h~ 
. , . . 
Atlantic sea routes, during periods of armed conflict; •; · 
' • . ·• • '<!._ " ;,·• • •. ··• 
: -~o'uld, preserit a p~rticula:rly wln.erable ,area ,for disritptirig . 
needed: mineral, shipments and thereby significan 1;1y impac~', , , . 
, ::·the ~it,ed; S~a~es' industrial .. base if th~ co.rifi.j.ct were 
. l ' ,, - , 
· -'broad .and· protracted. 
• ',• < • C • 
Potent~al for cartel Action 
· Over and• abov9- the ·geopolitical factors, that· might·, • 
. affect the, availilbility of platinum group metals 'there.I!;!: 
'.,. ' .. . ' .. - ' -·~, . . 
. . : . ' ; . ' . . ·, · .• •,.' ' . .. ' . ., ,. . . . . . . , ___ ._. ... ~ ·';:·~ ~-/~.. -. 
one largely ·ec~nomic factor· that could signifi:can,tly affe¢t . 
•· ~-: ,. •• . . . . . :, ; ' . : . . • • si• --~· ' •• ' . 
the ·price and avai.labili ty of these minerals~, The. pro".:/ 
. ', . 
ducJ.ngicompani.es thems~l~s- rather than' their ~o.vei:merttll 
".· .•. 
• ., 0:ould .ij<>t. · act to restrict ~upplies or increase ~rfces /·:' 
. _ .. ,, 
. Only l~ ve. prodi.i(?ing 'companies,, mi,i:ie the ~t majority of ~e ' ' ':: , : .. 
. . . ,'" ',, . . . . ··.· ·. < . : .. ' ; ' . . · .. '. . . ' ", .. , :·' _:, . ~- .. , . . ,; 
.> free. WQ?'.ld1 s pl~tinl.im~ and, the potential for c'ollqsive. ·.· .. , 
: , pric:'ing pra~~ices is ~uit,e··high. 12 . There is s~~~ ~~dehce :':·.:·. ' .. , 
' , ··" . . . -
·\hat plat~um p~~~ers have cooperated;in the :;past;in , ,. , ,, ·' · · 
.. ' .. ,.,,.' , ... •. • . ., - . , .. , 
a-itmnpti;: to COl).trol the 'price' of platinqm itself~, How:..· .. '' , 
·. . ·- !,, .. _ .. ---~:: .. - ' •' .. " •. ••. . ' ~ ,·· . ~ •. •' ··,,',:/ ·: .. -'," •. '. ! • ' ·,.,i;_.::·~·,.,"' 
ever'- it 'appears 1:hat.most previ,.ous actions 1were. lilnied . . / .. ": < •· · 
... .-.: ,. '·. : . ' '':'. _:. -_: .... ,·. ··: .·.. ' .· ' , '. -_ ' ' ..• ,. •'. ,'. ·:.. •. ·., .; ·.'.'.'. ' ··:'' 
. ·. : at ~t~b!lizl~ price1:1.and discouraging the ,d.evel~pmeilt \ i',, ... 
, ,', ~t ~latiritiini sub~tltutes:. 13 . Th~se, producers :'reailze,'.0tha{ /; ·. ''. , . 
. ..-, • • , ,e, . •, .-. . • 
· · -chemlcai. processes·: .cou~d be· developed that. did not use · 
' . ' . ,: 
',platiimoi or s~bsiftutes using less platinum could' be, ' 
.. \ ·,. ' •,. ' . 
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developed within the electrical industry. Although 
platinum demand is today relatively insensitive to price 
because its low cost relative to the total cost of the end 
items, substitutes would be developed and demand depressed 
if drastic long term price increases were to be experienced. 
Substitution 
Within the platinum group, palladium can be substi-
tuted for platinum in many of its electrical and electronic 
,• 
uses. Gold, silver, and tungsten are potential substitutes 
for platinum group metals in specific·electrical and elec-
tronic uses, but they too are costly and their properties 
vary somewhat. Thus, some inves_tment in the development 
of these substitutes would be necessary. "Other materials 
or processes could be substituted for the.use of platinum 
catalysts in petroleum refining and chemicals, but this 
would be a lengthy and expensive endeavor. 1114 The 
availability of substitute materials or processes although 
costly, has been an important factor in stabilizing the 
price and availability of platinum group metals in the 
past and it is likely to do so in the future. 
Stockpiling 
Three of the platinum group metals, iridium, palla-
dium, and platinum, have been designated as strategic 
materials. As such, stockpiles of these metals are 
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maintained by the Federal Preparedness Agency to decrease· 
the dangerous and costly dependence of the United States. 
upon foreign sources_ for these materials during periods of 
national emergency. 
As of JO June 1975, the national stockpiles of platinum 
· grou·p · metals contained 17,002 · troy ounces of iridium, . 
1,254,994 troy ounces of-palladium, and. 452,645,troy 
ounces .of platinum. 15 The total value of these stockpiles 
was about $184,500,000. 
The Federa,l Preparedness Agency has developed _objec-. · 
tive stockpile levels for·each of these metals, These· 
objectives are based on the high priority requiremeni;s for 
each of these metals during the first year of a major 
conventional war, Adjustments have been made in each' of.· 
· .the ~bjec.ti ves to allow for substitution ~f other mate.rials · 
. durin_g the. first ye~r of the emergency. T~e current objec..: 
tive levels are 1,800 troy ounces of iridium, )28,500 troy . . ' - . . ·, 
.. ·· .. 16 
·· .. · .:.ounc'es .of i:,alladium; and 187,500 troy _ounces of platinum,•, . . : 
Al though the current stockpile inventory levels .are 
vrell above the. objective levels, the Fec!e.ral Pi;eparednes1:1 
A~ency is· not reducing -its inventories, .. Current iegisla- ' 
tion does not authorize the disposal of platinum group'. 
1i1etals. · Such _disposal· legislation would have to be en-
acted by Congr.ess prior to the Federal Preparedness Agenc_y 
redu.cing current stockpile levels. 
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Development of Domestic Sources 
·As indicated in Table 19, very little primary.platinum 
group metal is produced in the United States. "Although. 
the United States has sizeable resources of the platinum-
group metals, they are undeveloped, very poorly define'd, 
and mostly sub.economic at current prices. It ·is unlikely 
·' that domestic production will ever satisfy domestic de-
· 17 mand. "· . · Even a.s .a by-produc.t in the mining of copper; 
. domestic production has difficulty competing _·with foreign 
sources. Increases in the relative prices of platinum.· 
group metals, or severe reductions in their availability 
·on international markets would be required before the . 
domestic production of primary metals would be expanded;•. 
:rhe refining· of secondary or reprci-cessed platinum 
group metals satisfies a large portion of the domestic de-
.. mand ~or these metals. As shown by Table 1.9, this 
secondl!,ry production has satisfied about 20% of the United 
States• demand from 1971 through 1975, Secondary recovery . ' 
of platinum catalysts ·1s possible with a loss o_f only 1% 
to 2% · of the platinum.• However, in times of emergency, 
this s·upply of platinum group metals might also be expected 
. to diminish as the period of the emergency becomes more. 
prolonged. As· the pri~e of primary platinum_.rose or iiis · .. 
availability became restricted, subs ti tu·tion would result, . 
. . 
and the source ·oi' metals for secondary reprocessing would · 
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thus-become smaller. However, in the short run, this 
secondary production could be diverted .from lower to 




· · . In ranking 74 strategic materials as to their _poten-
-'. · tial _ .for adversely influencing the United States• national 
· _ securfty, the Stanford_ Research Institute ranked .the 
platinum group metals as the third _most severe problem 
area, ·Four factors contributed signi.ficantly to this 
high rankings the relatively low level·o.r _domestic re-
serves, the high dependency on imports, the dif.ficulty 6.f 
substitution in the short run, and the wlnerability o'f 
the primary sources o.f platinum group metals, This_high 
ranking appears justified, -al though the Stanford study _ 
·may hav~ over emphasized the difficulty of substitution. 
Their position on substitution is not fully consistent • 
· . with that o.f the Bure.au of Mines or the Council on Inter-· 
national Economic Policy, 
From this_ review, it is apparent that on· ·a world,;. · 
· wide ·basis ample reserves of platinum group metals exist 
to m~e_t 'future expecte(l demand levels, While the ·united 
States• resources' of platinum group. metals are extensive' 
' . ' 
they are subeconomic. Thus, the known United States• 
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reserves are very limited and if fully exploited, could 
not· suppor_t . even a · reduced domestic demand for more than 
a re,v'· years, Even in a national emergency .it would be 
difficult to develop these s_ources since much of th_e 
platinum is produced as a by-product of other mining 
· operations. 
The sources of the platinum group metals.seems to be 
particu_la.rly vulnerable. This vulnerability is 
0
exempli-
. fied by the United States• dependence on the Soviet Union 
for o'ver 50% of its palladium imports, The current poli ti- . 
cal. situation in the Republic of South Africa and its 
· neighboring nations also raises serious questions as to 
that nation's future reliability as the ultimate supplier· 
of over 50% of the United States• platinum group imports •. 
The national s.tockpile objectives for the platinum 
.s;roup metals when·· combined with the domestic secondary · 
pro_duction seem sufficient to assure the continued support. -i 
, of .'defense requirements and other high priority uses 
during the ·first year or so of a conventional a;,ned con-
flict. ·During this period of emergency, lower priority 
uses would _have to be curtail"'" er supported at. a lower 
·level.· The current stoclmile levels which are well above . . ~ . ' . 
objective. levels could support a more protracted conflict'. 
However,the ability of the national stockpiles to support 




seems limited.. ·These limitations would be acute if 
stockpi_le· levels were· reduced to objective levels •. · Given 
the vu_lnerabili ty of our primary sources of platinum· and · 
palladium, it is not unlikely that an ideological or 
· political confrontation _;,rell below the level of armed 
co_nflict · might result. in the denial of needed. _platinum 
group·metals for periods well in excess of one year • 
. This· would require the _costly and lengthly development 
of.substitutes. The national stockpile objectives for· 
the$_e metals should give greater consideration to the· 
vulnerability of sources of supply and the potential fo·r 
-protracted emergencies below the level of armed conflict. 
Our relations with bo.th South Africa and' the Soviet Unicm-
and '!;he outlook for future relations sh_ould play an_ 
· _impo_rtant role ,in developing stockpile levels for iridium, 
palladium iand. platinum. 
· Tvu,· other actions that would ·seem· both feasible and 
' . . . 
;: .,apprc;,priate would be to encourage the development of . 
. . . 
materi,als or processes to. replace the pl.atinum group 
·metals. and to encourage ·the domestic and i_nternatio?U;ll 
exploration for new sources of these metals. Since sub-
.. 
sti ttit_ions· of. materials and processes seem to be available, 
the government might consider the funding of. research- : / 
directed _towards economically exploiting these .possibili-· 
. . . . . . ' ' 
ties. This would be one means of alleviating our rel.lance 
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. ' 
on. the.· platinum group metals, and the national stockpiles. 
. . 
Likewise, :the encouragement of exploration might alleviat~ 
this potential problem by discovering and developing new 
and potentially less vulnerable sources of. these needed · 
.metals,. New sources of platinum could be import~t 
.during an· extended· emergency·, since United Sta,tes • ·re-·:· 
.serves _are very limited and current prime sources seem : 
particularly vulnerable to disruption, No efforts 
' . . 
·.,'.directed towards either of the above purposes were-
_ found ih researching this paper. 
A. short term disruption of the flow of platinum 
group metals from foreign sources would have little 
' ,, . . 
impact, on the.· United States' _national secui;i ty, but a 
·1orig J;'Un disruption vrould be costly, if possible, to. 
overcome and could seriously threaten· the national .. 
·security because of the many basic uses of the plat~num 
group metals. 
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· CHAPTER VI 
CONC:tUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
.'' Rec~ntiy 'seyeral ;authc,rs have written books or. 
' ;/ ··;rticles describing .the many a~d 
' . . . ,_ . ' '' - ' varied ·pro1>Iems .tha't , . •: 
._: : \the ivcila, and_. i~' pa+'ticular the 
' ' ., 
United 'states, face~ .as . . , ' , ... · 
•·regards, the· consumption of m'ine:t'.als. . The tone o:f the;e• · · 
· ;~ritin~ · h~~ · :no~ally · b~en ~im~~ishing. suppl~e~ : 9f . •· · •.. .. 
- '', . ' . . . . . 
· .· ~tri,ra,is" J.nc'reasing demand. ror :these same. minerals· ~~•. 
I ' " 
'the· ensuJnii(probl:ems ~hich must irtevitably result froiii\.·. · .. 
- ,._ . . ; . ·- . . . " ' . ' .. - . ' ., - ~ ' ··;, . 
,· these intersect.i.ng conditions .•. • 
' ., ., . ',-, ,. ,. . . . . ,.. ' - . ' ' 
the;,1e/_a.uthors has• often been to 
'l'he methodology·• used by.'.-,,;' 
: • • •• ••• - • ' ' • • • ,\ '. : : {' '"' > 
identify iiroblems. arr~c:t'::-
. tng'. s~ecific min~~~ls ~and :from :these· to gel'!,E!ralize >the' 
• ' '• ' • '• • ; ',.. ., _<•~ : ; 
, . , " ,, ' 
' ··'.~ttR~.~~:::~d dem_a!1d_: rel:t~ons~ips of all mineral: re~our~e.s :·.:_•; 
. , . : ',, This paper. has attempted to pursue :th~ tone: of>·, . ;; : 
- ·'.'. •• .•. • ' - '1 -.. • • • •• ' ' • . •• ;_ •• : • • ,. " '. ',._ ·• 
· :p~-~i~us writings. w1{.i.ie avoiding at lea;s:t. part o:t: the .. 
,, / . ,-. . ' ' . . . . 
. p~e·~~~~tnt .:neth'oa'~1~~', . In so doing, .1:t. li,as,.recogni:zl!d · .· .. ,,· ',;;> 
tha.t_~PC?~i'.~ic.suppiy, demand.; and acces,s pro~lems do· ,. · ·'.'' 
. ~xil';lt as ;e~rds- the {!n~ted · States• corisum;t{o~ of : ' <;, c, 
\:_ ~~f~~ium;_ cobalt; and·the platinum group nie:tal~. It_'::',,::-,··.:-':; 
: ;', nas .analy~e·a each ci_f their specific problems .an_d a:-ttempi~if 
. ~,:;,:· t~ :;l.dfint'i±y the zri~;t· advantageous means' ~f meeting:· thei~-: :• .• :· '. ". :., , .
. ·• ,_ • ·J", t ' ' "• - .... " . -
: • 1 ·, · 1.14 . · . , )' . ·:,1:•.; · ,, . • . :,;;-, 
- -~ ' .~,- •. _,," i' !' ,. ,· ' 
,_., _., .. ~:;: :: . 
. :. ·: \:;_·,.: . . , . '._i /<,· )·:·.: ... ,;: . 
,, 
specific challenge. It has not, however, attempted to 
cover the broader area of minerals in general which is 
commonly addressed. 
As a result of this detailed, as opposed to compre-
hensive approach to the problem, certain conclusions and 
recommendations relative to the specific minerals studied 
have been reached. Additionally, although the sample of 
minerals studied was small, certain hypotheses have been 
formed which may prove applicable to many different 
minerals. These conclusions, rec·c:immendations and hypoth-
esis will now be summarized in terms of the specific 
minerals studied. 
Chromium. This study concl_uded that adequate re-
serves of chromite ores exist to support projected United 
States' and world-wide consumption until well into the 
next century. It further concluded that presently re-
coverable reserves are almost exclusively confined to 
the Asian and African continents and the Philippines 
Archipelago. The United States presently has no chromite 
ores which are economically recoverable and thus is wholly 
dependent on imports of chromium to meet her domestic 
consumption needs. South Africa, the Soviet Union, 
Rhodesia, Turkey and the Philippines are the principal 
producers of chromite ores and could in theory deny the 
United States an adequate supply of essential chromium 
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through cartel-like actions, While possible, such action 
is presently con'si dered quite unlikely for several rea-. 
sons •. Chief.among these reasons is the need for 
coop~ratlon and concerned action between the. Soviet 
. Union and a South African/Rhodesian coalition. Such· . 
. agreement appears unlikely ii:t the foreseeable-future 
because of the extensive political and economic differences 
' . ~ . . 
' . 
which exist between the Soviet Union and South Africa/ 
' ' . . 
Rhodesia as' ·a group; The existing United States I stock-
pile of chromium is a second major reason. 
Short run interruptions through cartel-like actions . · 
are likely to be ineff'ective. The stockpile presently 
contains suf'ficient chromium, in several fonns, t·o• mJ!et. 
high priority nationai needs for approximately tii'ree . 
. year:;. Thus, ·any· cartel faces the· loss of revenues f'or 
a period of up to three years before. th_ey 'could apply·:· 
' . ' , . . . . . \ . . . ' ' . , ' . . .. ' 
effective leverage against .the United States. This . _-. 
· stockpile supply als.o affords an additional benefit of 
ailov1ing :time to develop substitute~ ·for ~hromium or to 
reestablish ,-domestic. production of. chromium, using· exist'--· .. 
. ing •sub-economi,c domestic ores. The recently established· 
stockpile objective, a one year supply of chromium; would 
. reduce 'the on hand quantity by two-thirds, This change, .. 
. appears ·to .be unwise ·bec_ause of the proven diff'.icul-tf~s. 
in substi tutiori' and in the tim.e necessary to. establish 
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d_omestic production. For this reason, a. return to a 
thrQe year ic1tockpilc ob jecti.ve appears advisable .to 
s·upport. Unfted · Sta teci' commercial and military needs 
· for chromium·.• If; this action is taken, the outlook· for 
~ satisfactory_ lohg term supply of chrom~um appears highly. 
favorable, under all ;circum!cltances, short· of a major. out-
break. in hostilities., 
•. Cobalt. Aniong. the more specific, conclusions reached 
concerning the availability of cob.alt were. that ampl!). 
· reserves. exist to ·as.sure the long run supply of this 
··: .metal to the •Urii.ted States. •Both world and .domestic re-
, sources, seem adequate to meet projl;!cted international.and 
· 'United States•·· demand for seve.ral hundred years to come, 
Howeve·r,. domestic• resources are currently subeconomic., 
Therefore; at ?resent, there is no dom~stic production·. of. 
'c9balt, 'and disruptions in the. flow of. cobalt i~ports 'of 
. . ' . . ,' -. . . '. 
< •. • 
. , ., '.1.'short ·. term nature c.ould result. The .. mos.t ·li~e],y manner. 
'J', _.-- . 
· ·· in wh.i.ch .the flo11•. of cobalt coul.d. b_e seriously. interrupted . 
' 
·.; is t.hrough. ~ det!!rioration .of relatiohs with Zaire, the· 
• '. • ,e ' • ' • • •• • • r' •' ' 
: largest exporter ?f cobalt,. or through the in~erdici-t;iori 
',of' ti:an,sportation''sys,:tems by a third power;;. The .recel'\t . 
. :. pr~blems in Angola and' Rhodesia, when ;iewed in ,th'e light 
'·. o'.f an increased &6,tiet naval presence in the area, .. aeenL . 
. ••.•·to·rais·e the potential for such disruption in the flow 
of· cob'al t· •. · 'rh~ United States• strategic st?ckpile. 
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,. 
current:):y maintains su.ffici,mt cobalt to .satisfy the. high 
priority national needs fer cobalt for·more than one year. 
'l'his should be sufficient to cover most emergen_cies .since 
. duri.ng ·a ordtracted em·ergency high priority requirements 
for cobalt.mirrht be satisfied by··developing current- sub-. ' . . ' ·~· . 
·econ.omic_ domestic res'ources. 
. ,. ,, 
Current national planning ·: 
. and ·cont;-ol concerning cob.alt consumption and. stockpiling 
·appears adequate. Some substitution of nickel· for cobalt 
is oossible_, further alleviating the potential" problems, -. ·. . . 
' 1/hiie · cobalt · is critical to both the _defense and private 
s.ec:tor~ of. the ei!onomy, the potential for serious problems 
arising 1n the near. future because of disruptit.ins. in ·the 
importation of_this P'.1rticular metal is small, 
· Platinum· Gi'o1ffi. · The problem of assuring an adequate: 
. ~ .. ~d uninterrup.ted_ supp_ly of t_he. platinum group of metal!\!-
:: ··.ts somewhat more. acute than that of· cobalt. ln/1lile. world, 
reserves of the platinum metals are· plentiful, -domestic 
.. 
: reserves :are- sparse and could not satisfy even high . ' ,. ... '·. . . . ' 
·p~iori ty need~ of the United States· for more than. a few: 
year~, . :substanti~l:J_y all of the United States' i;-equire-:·:. 
inenti. for platihttm group metals are met by the impor1;ing 
.. ·or: in:~tal ;rigfr1atine fror.i el ther ~he Reptibli~ of South 
Africa, or the :3ov·ie:t Union, or by the domestic reproces-. . ' 
· ~inf{-of scrap _o,r secondary· metal. Poli:t;ical turmo'il or 
arm~·d co11fli°ct-,b;icause· of the apartheid issue_ could· 
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damage, or at least disrupt, the economic structure.of 
South Africa, thereby jeopardizing our prime supply of 
platinum group metals. Likewise, an ideological or 
political confrontation with the Soviet Union might 
close this source of supply. The Federal Preparedness 
Agency has established a stockpile objective for the 
platinum group metals equivalent to one year's h~gh 
priority use of these metals. This objective level, 
although substantially below the current actual stock·-
pile level, would meet the cri ter.ia that the stockpile 
satisfy United States' demand for the first year of an 
armed conflict. However, in the case of the platinum 
group metals_, disruptions of wel_l over one year could be 
experienced as a result of problems that would not likely 
involve the United States in armed conflict. Since the 
sources of these metals seem to be vulnerable to lengthy 
interruptions, a stockpile level substantially larger 
than the current objective stockpile level seems appro-
priate for the platinum group minerals. To further 
alleviate the potential for problems concerning the 
availability of these metals, two other actions appear 
worthy of note. Research aimed at finding economic sub-
stitutes for the platinum group metals or the processes 
that require them as a catalyst should be encouraged. 
Likewise, the exploration and development for new 
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diversified and potentially less vulnerable sources of 
platinum might be fostered. While the defense uses of 
the platinum group metals are not as extensive as some 
other minerals, the extended interruption in their avail-
abilitf would adversely impact the United States' 
national interests. Because of our almost total depen-
dence on imports and the high level of vulnerability of 
the' sources, platinum group metals present a high poten-
tial for future critical shortages of needed materials. 
General Conclusions. Although the number of minerals 
reviewed in this study is limited, certain preliminary 
conclusions or hypotheses can be reached regarding the 
more all encompassing problem of mineral consumption in 
general. 
First, the problem of mineral shortages, while serious, 
is a ·problem of specific shortages, not general. Solu-
tions to these individual problems must address the 
specific shortage problems. 
Secondly, the extent of the mineral shortage problem 
is probably less than is popularly publicized. While 
only three minerals were considered in this study, they 
were among those genrally regarded to present significant 
problems to the national security. In each case studied, 
several means were available to alleviate the potential 
for problems. In the short-run, these have primarily 
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involved stocl~pilinG of minerals and the limited use· of' 
·substitutions •. In the long-•run, changes in technology 
. such. ias·•the possibility o:f eictraction of minerals from 
the_':seµ or the development of a_ddi tional substitute 
materia·l~ o·r pr·ocesses will offer additional solutions;,. 
P.1nally, as the internat°ional supply of a specific 
. mi~ez:a:!.' lags ).ts_ ,demand, the relati. ve price of that 
-". mineral ·must.' inev1\i3.bly ri.se, and thereby increase· the ·. 
. · •. , ·' . . . . . .l , 
., 
· economi~ally ··recnverable reserves of that mine·ral. , This 
. ·.pr'icf.l· 1ncre3:se would ~imultaneously reduce 'the demand for 
·.•this :r,1inera1· and further alleviate the problem of m'ineral 
shortage·.· 
· F'.irial)y, ·our reliance on several .imported ·strategic· 
'.' 
.',ninr;;als, essential to maintaining a strong economy 
clearly indic?..tes the :nec.essi ty of a comprehensive 
-forf;.lgn policy with supplying nations that considers· 
. . I 
economic interdependen'cy. 
' :-·" i 
Recommendations for Further Study, ·or ·necessity,· this •, . . . . .. . 
study has been ext-reinely limited .. Onl:y three minerals ., . . .. . : 
w~re·: examined and, the~·e are many others: that p:resent · 
' ,: ' •., '• ' ' L • : 
:potentiaL shortage problems vihich could oignificantiy . -· . ' ·, . . . . 
, .iinpadt,, th_e Untt;ed St3:tes' national· security. Each of 
·. thesi:l\liT\eralr;: ~equi.re· ·further detailed ·study to prevent 
'·rutur~ :~rftical shorta~es from arising, which_ could 
· thre?'.te~ United · States national security, . This study ·· 
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could serve as a forma t for t hese further s tudies. 
Alternatively, t he problem as it affects imports might 
be examined from a predominantly for eign pol icy or inter-
national relations aspect, whereby the impact of the total 
mineral imports from one or more nations might be examined 
for its implication on United States• national security. 
Whatever methodology is employed, it is first necessary 
to understand that the problem of resource availability 
is not insoluble as suggested by General Lagovskiy•s 
"weak link". The problem is indeed complex and involves 
numerous interrelated economic, political, geographic, and 
social factors. Once t his realization is reached, this 
nation must evaluate all factors affectine the availability 
of a specific mineral and select an optim~m program for 
ensuring its continued availability. Such a program must 
be dynamic and adaptahle to changes in the relevant 
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